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## Matthias Corvinus' Anti-Ottoman Policies in the Early 1470':

### Political Patterns, Military Actions and Late Medieval Propaganda

The 'low-born' contested king Matthias Corvinus was enthroned a crusader without having proven to be one. His was a crusader by blood, as the son of *athlete* John (Ioan/Iancu, János) Hunyadi. It played a great role, especially on the continental level, ensuring Matthias the immediate support of Calixt III and the eventual aid of Pius II. It was both his lasting political safe-conduct (for he was expected to do great things) and political handicap (for his actions turned out to be no match for these expectations). From his failed anti-Ottoman plan of 1467, which helped sparkle the Transylvanian rebellion, a plan drafted together with his previous and future arch-enemy, then his *adoptive father*, Frederic(k) (Friedrich) III of Habsburg, to the Djem crisis, when he appeared both as the Christian *Mars* and the blood-relative of the sultans, his 'crusa-der career' was a constant and aware mixture of high-profile politically correct speech and equally useful compromise, grounded on the every-day frontier life with the Ottomans and on the limits and resources of the much challenged *bulwark of Christendom*, the Hungarian realm<sup>1</sup>.

Matthias seemingly never forgot an aspect, which he, like many contemporary "analysts' and politicians, overlooked in their discourses. Had it not been for the 'miracle of Belgrade', Hunyadi's anti-Ottoman, in particular, career would have ended as a failure, after the defeats of Varna (1444) and Kossovopolje (1448), regardless of who was actually to blame for them. Due to the Hungarian civil war of 1456-1458, which threw him into prison and costed his brother's life, while all anti-Ottoman hope faded into

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview: RÁZSÓ (Gyula), *Die Türkenpolitik Matthias Corvinus*, in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest), XXXII (1986), 1-2, pp. 19-23; POPOVIĆ (Mihailo), *Mara Branković-Leben und Wirken einer Frau an der kulturellen Schnittstelle zwischen Serben, Byzantinern und Osmanen*, PhD Thesis, Vienna, 2005, pp. 144-146; SCHMITT (Oliver Jens), *Skanderbegs letzte Jahre. West-östliches Wechselspiel von Diplomatie und Krieg im Zeit alter der osmanischen Eroberung Albanies (1464-1468)*, in *Süd-Ost Forschungen* (Munich), LXIV-LXV (2004-2005 [2007]), pp. 56-123; see in particular the study of HOUSLEY (Norman), *Matthias Corvinus and Crusading*, in *Between Worlds, IV, Matthias Corvinus and his Time* (= *Mélanges d'Histoire Générale, Nouvelle Série, I, 4*), general-editor POP (Ioan-Aurel), edited by MAKÓ LUPESCU (Mária), RÜSZ-FOGARASI (Enikő), SÁLÁGEAN (Tudor), SIMON (Alexandru), Cluj-Napoca, 2009.

speech and plans after Belgrade, the king was probably well aware of another fact. Hunyadi could hardly have duplicated the victory of Belgrade and preserved his glorious (re-glorified that is) profile in front of his domestic and regional adversaries. Matthias' main aim was to remain king, not to defeat the *Turk* for good, as long as defeating the *Turk* did not automatically imply his survival (and success) as a king. After the troubles of his first decade of rule (the contest for the Holy Crown, the partial Bosnian successes against Mehmed II, the domestic plots, the costly 'Bohemian crusade'), this aspects must have been particularly clear for the still young king Matthias at the beginning of the 1470<sup>2</sup>.

### East-Central European Warfare and Politics in the 1470'

In early 1474, the Ottomans raided Hungary's central administrative bridge, connecting Buda (Ofen) to Transylvania. It was the most important Ottoman act of aggression known by the realm, since 1438. The memory of the devastating campaign led by sultan Murad II or of more recent Ottoman raids (devastations according to Jan Długosz, the well-known adversary of the Hunyadis) into Transylvania (1469 or 1470), raids which had occurred in spite of the Ottoman-Hungarian truce of spring 1468, was consequently very vivid. Lately, the Ottoman-Hungarian tensions had mounted. Neither Matthias Corvinus, who had not taken any major anti-Ottoman military action since his second Bosnian campaign (1464), nor Mehmed II had managed to diplomatically convince his counterpart to give in to his proposals (1472-1473). The truce of 1468, valid for two years, like the later 'more official' Ottoman-Hungarian treaties of the mid and late 1480', renewed in 1470 and 1472, ceased to directly and significantly influence future events, at least over the next few years (1473/1474-1475/1476). In return, the door to Ottoman talks

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<sup>2</sup> SIMON (Alexandru), *The Lion in Winter: John Hunyadi's Career from Kossovopolje to Belgrade (1448-1456)*, in *Between Worlds*, II, *Extincta est lucerna orbis. John Hunyadi and his Time* (=Mélanges d'Histoire Générale, Nouvelle Série, I, 2), edited by DUMITRAN (Ana), MÁDLY (Loránd), SIMON (Alexandru), Cluj-Napoca, 2008, pp. 503-522; MUREȘAN (Dan-Ioan), *La place de Girolamo Lando, patrician vénétien et titulaire du Patriarcat de Constantinople (1474-1497), dans la politique orientale del'Église de Rome*, in *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia* (Venice), VIII (2006), pp. 153-258. The main archival information has been extracted from Italian funds: ASG (Archivio di Stato di Genova, Genoa), Archi-vio Segreto (A.S.), ASM (Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan), Archivio Ducale Sforzesco (A.D.S.), ASV (Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City), Armadi (Arm.), Miscellanea (Misc.), Armadi (Arm.); ASVe (Archivio di Stato di Venezia), Senato Secreti (S.S.). Other very useful sources can be found in HHStA (Haus-, Hof- und Staats-archiv, Vienna), Handschriftensammlung (Hs.S.), Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv (M.E.A.), Reichshofkanzlei (R.H. K.), Staatenabteilungen (S.A.), Ausserdeutsche Staaten (A.D.S.), or in the *Antemohacsiana* section of MOL (Magyar Országos Levéltár [The National Hungarian Archives], Budapest), (Q section) Diplomatkai Levéltár [Diplomatic Archive] (DL), (U section) Diplomatkai Fényképgyűjtemény [Diplomatic Collection of Copies] (DF).

was never actually closed by the king, which justified Roman and Venetian concerns, as well as Jagiellonian and Habsburg charges, in particular after 14763.

In early 1476, propaganda and revived crusader hope, as well as defeat, after the anti-Ottoman victory of Vaslui (January) and the fall of Caffa (June 1475), gave the resemblance of a Christian triumph to the Hungarian conquest of Sabač (Szabacs). The first half of 1476 was one of the very few cases in which the hope for a Christian victory over the Turk was a match fear caused by the imminent Ottoman military reaction. It overshadowed even the domestic military and political difficulties of each Christian party involved in anti-Ottoman plans and also the conflicts between these parties (Hungary, Moldavia and the Houses Jagiello and Habsburg) over crusader subsidies and ranks, conflicts carried on namely in Rome and Venice, the financial and political pillars of such late medieval anti-Ottoman endeavors. With his long desired marriage in view, Matthias Corvinus seemed on the verge of exiting the real political trap created over the last years by his conflicts with the Habsburgs and Jagiellonians, over the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns, as well as for control over Walachia and Moldavia, by his strained relation with Venice or by his increasingly complicated relation with the papacy<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> E.g. NAGY (Iván), NYÁRY (Albert B.), *Magyar diplomaciai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458-1490* [Souvenirs of the Hungarian Diplomacy: The Age of King Matthias. 1458-1490] (= *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*, IV, 1-4) Budapest, 1875-1878 (MDE); 4 volumes, I, no. 175, p. 290, no. 179, p. 297; II, no. 46, p. 76; PALL (Francisc), *I rapporti italo-albanesi intorno alla metà del secolo XV*, in *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane* (Naples), IV (LXXXIII) (1966), p. 131 (note 29); DE NYIRKÁLLO (Támas), *Epitaphium super excisione urbis Varadiensis*, in *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Minores hactenus inediti, synchroni aut proxime coaevi* (Buda), edited by KOVACHICH (Márton György), II (1798), pp. 9-11; [DŁUGOSZ (Jan)], *Jan Długosii Senioris Canonici Cracoviensis Opera omnia*, edited by PRZEDZIECKI (Alexander), XIV, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII* [II], Krakow, 1887, pp. 495, 510, 525, 546; [BONFINI (Antonio)] *Antonius de Bonfinis, Rerum Ungaricarum decades*, edited by FŐGEL (József), JUHÁSZ (László), IVÁNYI (Béla), IV, Leipzig, 1941, pp. 15-23; *Kemal Paşa Zade*, in *Cronici turcești privind țările române. Extrase* [Turkish Chronicles regarding the Romanian Countries. Selections], I, edited by GUBOGLU (Mihail), MEHMET (Mustafa Ali), Bucharest, 1966, pp. 207-208; see SIMON (Alexandru), *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus: A Medieval Coexistence], Cluj-Napoca, 2007, pp. 201-210, 243.

<sup>4</sup> In these matters, though it provides no real first hand information, *Regesten Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440-1493)*. *Nach Archiven und Bibliotheken geordnet* (= [Johann].F[riedrich]. Böhmer, *Regesta Imperii*, XIII), general editors KOLLER (Heinrich), HEINIG (Paul-Joachim), NIEDERSTÄTTER (Alois), Vienna-Cologne-Graz-Weimar, 1982-2006 (22 volumes, 2(3) supplements) is more than eloquent in terms of Central European Ottoman affairs and attitudes. For direct information and interpretation, see CHMEL (Joseph), *Regesta chronologica-diplomatica Friderici III. Romanorum Imperatoris*, Vienna, 1838 [1840] nos. 6846-7127, pp. 665-685; no. 7083, p. 682; IDEM, *Monumenta Habsburgica. Sammlung von Aktenstücken und Briefen zur Geschichte des Hauses Habsburgs im Zeitraume von 1473 bis 1576*, Vienna, 1854-1858, 4 volumes in 2 series; I-1, no. 187, p. 500-504, I-2, no. 14, pp. 98-104; TELEKI (József), *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon* [The Age of the Hunyadis in Hungary <with Pictures and Plates>], Pest, 1843-1855, 12 volumes: X, nos. 148-

The second half of 1476 virtually annihilated most of these hopes. The money collected by the papacy and the Venetian republic arrived with great delay and Buda and seemed insufficient for successful anti-Ottoman warfare. By that time, sultan Mehmed II was already re-treating from Moldavia, after ravaging the country, but also after failing to secure Ottoman control over it. In Moldavia, the conqueror of Constantinople should have been caught in a trap between Hungarian and Moldavian troops. The trap failed because Matthias was unable to gather his troops in due time, having to send troops from the West in order to support his reluctant vassal, Stephen (Ștefan) III cel Mare (the Great) of Moldavia. As for his part, the latter had failed to control his troops, following domestic unrests and Tartar attacks, and had been deserted by at least a third of his men prior even to the actual clash with the Ottoman army. However, successes over the retreating Ottoman troops and short-lived victories on the Sava and the Lower Danube partially redeemed the local crusader image, which looked less compromised than after previous (e.g. in 1474) and namely future anti-Ottoman military and political failures (such as those of 1480, 1481 or 1484). For a few moments, this seemed enough for the king on the eve of his long awaited marriage, but soon the situation rapidly changed<sup>5</sup>.

In winter 1476-1477, the situation looked worse for the Christian side than in late 1474. The opportunity for eternal glory, as the failed Hungarian-Moldavian (planned) action of mid 1476 was called, was lost. Unlike in early 1475, there came no major victory over the Turk in order to compensate for previous defeats and dysfunctional anti-Ottoman plans. Mehmed II retook control over the northern frontier of his empire and greeted the envoys of Matthias or Stephen III who came looking for a better Ottoman deal, hoping to profit for the political and military fatigue and losses of the sultan. Except for the Moldavian campaign in Walachia (late 1477), until October 1479 and the failed Ottoman campaign in Transylvania, no major fights took place in the Mid and Lower Danube areas. Even after the Hungarian victory of Câmpul Pâinii (Kenyérmező, Brotfeld), king Matthias thought

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149, pp. 200-202; see also JÁSZAY (Magda), *Contrastes et diplomatie dans les rapports de Matthias I<sup>er</sup> Corvin et la République de Venise*, in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum* (Budapest), XXXV (1989), 1-4, pp. 19-23, 27-30.

<sup>5</sup> *Codex Diplomaticus Partium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum. Magyarország Mellékartományainak Oklevéltára* (= *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*, I, 31, 33, 36, 40), II, THALLÓCZY (Lajos), ALDÁSY (Antal), *A Magyarország és Szerbia közti összeköttetések oklevéltára. 1198-1526* [Documents regarding the Relations at the Meeting-Point between Hungary and Serbia. 1198-1526], Budapest, 1907; no. 369, p. 284; PIENARU (Naghi), *Un document otoman necunoscut din 1476* [An Unknown Ottoman Document from 1476], in *Revis-ta Istorică* [Historical Review] (Bucharest), NS, XIII (2002), 1-2, pp. 229-241; KUBINYI (András), *Matthias Corvinus: The Man and the King*, in *Between Worlds, I, Stephen the Great, Matthias Corvinus and their Time* (= *Mélanges d'Histoire Générale, Nouvelle Série*, I, 1), edited by KOSZTA (László), MUREȘAN (Ovidiu), SIMON (Alexandru), Cluj-Napoca, 2007, pp. 35-36; see also SIMON, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 360-361.

it more fit to profit from the success by threatening with personal and political arguments his Christian counterparts and by seeking another arrangement with the sultan. Prior to the events that marked the crusade in the 1480' (the fall of Otranto, the Djem crisis, the conquest of Cetatea Albă (Akkerman) and Chilia), the political tide, dependent on financial resources, favored more and more the compromise, by military and diplomatic means, with the Porte, rather than constant major action against it<sup>6</sup>.

## I. The Cross and the Crowns

In theory, whether to the West (the Iberian *reconquista*) or to the East (the anti-Ottoman plans) the traditional (*Christian vs. Infidel*, not *Christian vs. Heretic*) crusade had no end, at least not until the Holy Sepulchre, its both primary and ultimate goal, was freed. Basically, like crusader vows, which were hereditary, crusader calls (through papal bullas) were constantly valid, other than in the cases of most indulgences or papal approved financial and political advantages (such as the recently re-imposed, by Paul II, Jubilee revenues). In fact, due to re-peated diplomatic and military failures, crusader calls had to be renewed and the 'crusaders' reminded of their duties, so that hope could live on and, in particular, money could be collected. Seemingly an attempt to bridge the profound contradiction between the apparently eternal character of the crusade (which could make each anti-Ottoman skirmish a crusader action) and the need for repeated (official) crusader calls (which in return fractured the concept of Christian duty) was started in the last days of pope Pius II (1463-1464). Periodically, every four years, the crusade had to be re-launched, regardless of the actual course of events<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> For instance: ASG, A.S., *Diversorum*, reg. 742, c. 4<sup>v</sup>; *Litterarum. Officium Monete*, reg. 1804, cc. 44<sup>r</sup>-45<sup>r</sup>; *Materie Politiche. Scritti in lingua orientale ed africana*, 2737 D, nn. [Documenti Greco-Bizantini], [dos. G] (13<sup>th</sup> of September 1480, 2<sup>nd</sup> of February, 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1481); ASM, A.D.S., Potenze estere, *Venezia*, cart. 362, fasc. 2, nn; fasc. 8, nn (19<sup>th</sup> of August 1476, 1<sup>st</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> of February 1476 More Veneto=1477); ASV, Misc., Arn., II-20, f. 44<sup>r</sup>-46<sup>r</sup> [December 1480-March 1481]; ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 28, cc. 2<sup>v</sup>, 74<sup>r-v</sup> reg. 29, cc. 21<sup>r</sup>, 32<sup>r</sup> (18<sup>th</sup> of March, 29<sup>th</sup> of December 1477, 12<sup>th</sup> of July, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1479); RÁZSÓ (Gyula), *Die Feldzüge Königs Mathias Corvinus in Niederösterreich 1477-1490*, Wien, 1973, pp. 4-6; SZAKÁLY (Ferenc), FODOR (Pál), *A kenyérmezei csata (1479. október 13.)* [The Battle on the Breadfield. 13<sup>th</sup> of October 1479], in *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* [Contributions in Military History] (Budapest), CXI (1998), 2, pp. 309-350.

<sup>7</sup> BENEŠ (František), *Depositeria generale della crociata*, in *Československý Časopis historický* [Czechoslovakian Historical Review] (Prague), XIV (1966), 5, pp. 738-757; HOUSLEY (Norman), *The Crusading Movement, 1274-1700*, in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, edited by RILEY-SMITH (Jonathan), Oxford, 1995, pp. 260-295; IDEM, *Indulgences for Crusading, 1417-1517*, in *Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits: Indulgences in the Late Medieval Europe*, edited by SWANSON (Robert), Leiden, 2006, pp. 277-307; DAMIAN (Iulian-Mihai), *Il re e la crociata*, in *Between Worlds*, IV, forthcoming; however, the fact that, according to one of his successor's (Sixtus IV) first bullas (ASV, Arn. XXXI-62, f. 17<sup>v</sup>; 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1471), Paul II, who, though a Venetian, was not to found (to say the least) of the republic (but it went

On *Latin* East-Central European soil, where (in Hungary) the legal and political memory of Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxemburg's influence in ecclesiastical matters was still strong and where (in Poland) the conciliarist party was influential decades after the official victory of the papacy, it was hard to determine pro-Roman and anti-Ottoman action on strictly the basis of *Christian* duty and of loyalty towards the Holy See. Positive responses, as well as their actual consequences, were largely dependant on subsidies and the extent of the real direct Ottoman threat. These aspects basically left Hungary alone in front of the *Turk*, as king Casimir (Kazimierz) IV, focused on Bohemian, Teuton or Russian affairs, managed also to outlive, without too many major domestic difficulties, three different excommunications throughout his reign. It was thus, possible, at times (e.g. 1460', mid 1470' or early 1490'), Venice was able to have a greater impact on regional politics than Rome, even though it was separated by geography and tradition from Krakow and its connection to Buda was marked by a long history of strained Adriatic relations. Directly, as well as indirectly, such situations played in favor of Frederic III's politics, whose stubbornness and reluctance, well revealed in Ottoman, Hungarian or Bohemian matters, were favored by them. Still, Sixtus IV was determined to turn the tables to his and Rome's advantage<sup>8</sup>.

### 1. Crusading in the early 1470'

In late 1472, cardinal Bessarion died. He was the last survivor of the *Latin* and *Greek* political generations that had fought for Byzantium's rescue. Except for the pro-Ottoman Polish king Casimir IV Jagiello, for the reluctant emperor Frederic III of Habsburg and for Mehmed II, none of the other major political figures in power had taken an active part in the events of the 1440'-1450'. On one hand, these events had shaped the aims of the later crusader decades. On the other, by the demise of the main actors, they had left the way open for major crises. Failed Hungarian-Ottoman peace talks, combined with the ongoing Ottoman siege of Venetian Scutari and Ali Beg's raid of Oradea (Grosswardein, Nagyvarad), favored another set of long negotiated crusader actions. Crusader political

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both ways), had spent some 200.000 ducats on Matthias Corvinus, Skanderbeg, the Hospitallers and others, is rather doubtful (see in this respect only Skanderbeg's case in PALL, *Rapporti*, nos. 64-70, pp. 205-211; December 1466; nevertheless a naturally peculiar perspective in this matter: ASV, Reg. Vat. 540, ff. 16<sup>v</sup>-20<sup>v</sup>; 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 1468).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. NEHRING (Karl), 'Die ungarische Außenpolitik in der Zeit der Landshuter Hochzeit', *Österreichische Osthefte* (Vienna), XVIII (1976), pp. 236-245; TEKE (Zsuzsa), *Rapporti diplomatici tra Mattia Corvino e gli stati italiani*, in *Italia e Ungheria all'epoca dell'umanesimo corviniano*, edited by GRACIOTTI (Sante), VASOLI (Cesare), Florence, 1994, pp. 19-36; WOŚ (Jan Władisław), *Política e religione nella Polonia tardo medioevale*, Trento, 2000, pp. 48-50; PAPACOSTEA (Șerban), *Política externă a lui Ștefan cel Mare: opțiunea polonă (1459-1472)* [The Foreign Policy of Stephen the Great: The Polish Option. 1459-1472], in *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medievală* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] (Bucharest-Brăila), XXV (2007), pp. 13-28; see also BACZKOWSKI (Krzysztof), *Matthias Corvinus, Kasimir IV. und die Türkengefahr*, in *Between Worlds*, IV, forthcoming.

attention shifted, more than on one occasion, from the Bohemian wars to what was viewed as the long overdue great anti-Ottoman action. The so far very successful, on European soil, sultan Mehmed II after facing defeat in Asia Minor following the destructive raids of the Venetian fleet and the devastating Akkoyunlu raids led by Uzun Hassan (1472-1473), had turned the tables in his favor also on the other continent. As no lasting northern solution for his Bohemian conflicts with both the Jagiellonians and the Habsburgs was in view, the south-eastern context completed king Matthias' domestic concerns<sup>9</sup>.

After the death of pope Paul II (1471), who had turned the crusade from the South to the North, once more against the Hussites, the need for a crusader *grand design* was more than pressing. It had to compensate domestic troubles, both in Rome and in the rest of the 'free Christian world', and to restore the credit of the crusade, of the holy Christian war, at least to the level reached in the times of John Hunyadi and Skanderbeg. The means however seemed more reduced than in the previous decades. The 'crusader congress' of Regensburg had made that quite clear in mid-summer 1471. Venice's military and diplomatic failures, as well as territorial losses suffered during her war with the Porte, added to the complexity of the situation. *Latin* Christendom apparently had run out of crusader options. 'Peculiar' solutions re-took center-stage. Hence, talks with and on the *Infidels* (the Tartars or Uzun Hassan's Turks and Persians) and *Schismatics* (Russians and Walachians) were reinitiated (1471-1472). In Hungary, the failure of the 1471 'Vitéz plot' and of the Polish invasion also apparently worked in favor of an anti-Ottoman action, not so much because of diplomatic dealings of Venice or Bessarion, her trusted cardinal, in close ties to the plotters, but because the king, who blamed Venice too for the 1471 plot, had to find also an anti-Ottoman way out of his difficult situation<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> For an overview: HALECKI (Oskar) *Sixte IV et la chrétienté orientale*, in *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, II-1, *Orient Chrétien*, Vatican City, 1964, pp. 241-264; SETTON (Kenneth M.), *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, II, *The Fifteenth Century* (= *Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society*, CXXVII), Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 281-285; SZAKÁLY (Ferenc), *Phases of Turko-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács. 1365-1526*, in *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest), XXXIII (1979), pp. 88-94; NEHRING (Karl), *Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III und das Reich. Zum Hunyadisich-Habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum*, Munich, 1989<sup>2</sup>, pp. 41-45; see also the analysis in the study of DECEI (Aurel), *Incursiunea (Akîn) a lui Mihaloglu Ali Beg asupra Orăzii în anul 1474, pe temeiul istoriei lui Ibn Kemal [Mihaloglu Ali Beg's Raid on Oradea, according to Ibn Kemal's History (1474)]*, in *Sub semnul lui Clio. Oma-giu Acad. Prof. Ștefan Pascu [Under Clio's Sign: Festschrift for Ștefan Pascu]*, Cluj, 1974, pp. 296-301.

<sup>10</sup> MDE, II, no. 219, p. 332; BERCHET (Guglielmo), *La repubblica di Venezia e la Persia*, Turin, 1865, pp. 100-101; TURSUN BEY, *La conquista di Constantinopoli*, edited by BACQUÉ-GRAMMONT (Jean-Louis), BERNARDINI (Michele), BERARDI (Luca), Milan, 2007, pp. 208-209; VALENTINI (Giuseppe), *La sospensione della crociata nei primi anni di Paolo II (1464-1468). Dai documenti d'archivio di Venezia*, in *Archivium Historiae Pontificiae* (Rome), XIV, 1976, pp. 71-101; see HELMRATH (Johannes), *The German Reichstage and the Crusade*, in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact*, edited by HOUSLEY (Norman), New York, 2004, p. 64; MUREȘAN (Dan Ioan), *Bessarion, patriarche uniata de Constantinople, et l'Église de*

In order to make good for his contested pontificate, but also to further Bessarion's aims, the unsuccessful papal candidate of the last two elections and Venice's favorite, Sixtus IV approved the talks with *Infidels* and *Schismatics*. They were less costly than *Latin* negotiations. The niece of Constantine XI Palaeologus, Zoe, was wed to Ivan III, the great knjaz of Moscow (1472). The marriage, made possible by the fact that no major Latin monarch had wanted to marry Zoe, for she only had a great name, but no money, should have brought the crusade to Russia. Another *Greek* marriage gave (some) crusader hope in the East, connecting Moldavia to Crimean Theodoro. Stephen III wed Mary of Mangop, Zoe's *cousin* and one of Bessarion's numerous *nieces*. A (planned) *Latin* marriage could have also played in favor of the cross in the 1470'. Faced with Matthias' not too concealed reluctance towards him and eager to restore the balance of power in his tense relation to Venice, pope Sixtus IV endorsed the talks for his marriage to Beatrice, the daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon, the king of Naples (the talks officially began in mid 1474). In Christian to Christian political affairs and on the crusader level, Rome could not afford to lose either of this two contested kings to which few members of the traditional *Latin* European monarchical elite wanted to get connected, politically as well as dynastically<sup>11</sup>.

Rome was impoverished by its policies. Ferdinand of Aragon had re-become Venice's enemy after his (alleged) dramatic gesture following the Ottoman conquest of Negroponte, when he broke off relations with Mehmed, for the sultan had hurt his Venetian friends. Still, Rome and Venice were eager to find East-Central European political solutions for their Ottoman and also Italian troubles. No party involved in the dynastic clashes, now grouped around the fate of the Bohemian crown, was able to achieve lasting superiority. Hence, the regional conflict which should have hindered (and would eventually hinder) crusader designs, was viewed also as an opportunity to turn this northern conflict to the southern advantage of the two powers. The 'long mission' of papal legate Marco Barbo (1472-1474) or Venice's rather conciliant attitude towards Buda in Dalmatian and Croatian matters revealed this risky line of political planning. Due to

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*rite grec du royaume de Hongrie (1463-1472)*, in *Matthias Corvinus and his Time (Cluj-Napoca, 23<sup>rd</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> of October 2008)*, edited by SĂLĂGEAN (Tudor), SIMON (Alexandru), Cluj-Napoca, 2008, pp. 161-163 (see namely the extended version of the paper in *Between Worlds, IV, Matthias Corvinus and his Time*).

<sup>11</sup> E.g. BERZEVICZY (Albert), *Acta vitam Beatricis reginae Hungariae illustrantia. Aragóniai Beatrix magyar királyné életére vonatkozó okiratok (= Monumenta Hungariae Historica, I, 39)*, Budapest, 1914, no. 9, p. 14; no. 47, p. 69; MDE, II, no. 56, p. 89; no. 176, p. 252; [MALPIERO (Domenico)], *Annali veneti dall'anno 1457 al 1500 del Senatore Domenico Malipiero ordinati e abbreviati dal senatore Francesco Longo*, in (=) *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1<sup>st</sup> series, VII, 1, edited by SAGREDO (Agostino), Florence, 1843, p. 93; *Der Aufstieg Moskaus (=Slawische Geschichtsschreiber, V)*, editor NIISCHE (Peter), II, Graz-Vienna-Cologne, 1967, p. 135; KOVÁCS (Péter E.), *Magyarország és Nápoly politikai kapcsolatai a Mátyás-korban [The Political Relations between Hungary and Naples in Matthias' Time]*, in *Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére [Studies in the Memory of Ferenc Szakály]*, edited by FODOR (Pál), PÁLFFY (Géza), TÓTH (István György), Budapest, 1998, pp. 229-231, 236-237; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, p. 318; see here also, PIEMONTESE (Angelo Michele), *La représentation de Uzun Hasan sur scène à Rome (2 mars 1473)*, in *Turcica*, XXI-XXIII (1991), pp. 191-203.

Italian rivalries, coordination between Venice and Rome was more difficult than in the days of Pius II and coherent joint diplomatic pressures in favor of the crusade were rare. In this respect, Matthias' various political fronts and engagements also hindered coherent crusader action, as revealed by the rumors on his death in 1471, during the Regensburg congress or by the impact of the Bohemian course of events on his Milanese efforts two years later<sup>12</sup>.

## 2. East-Central European Political Conflicts

Since their failed meeting of Vienna (1470), Frederic III was more than ever Matthias arch-enemy. Though another failed monarchic meeting, under virtually the same circumstances, between Frederic III and Charles the Bold of Burgundy gave Matthias some not only potential western breathing space, the Habsburg concern reduced his political freedom of action, in crusader matters too. Also because of domestic pressures, Frederic III was very attentive to make the most out of crusader rhetoric and talks. The 'unworthy crusader' Matthias, unable and, to a certain degree, unwilling, at times, to take anti-Ottoman action, was to be suffocated between the most fashionable and numerous German *Türkentage* and the emperors repeated crusader promises. Interestingly enough, these *Türkentage* came to an all time low in terms of frequency and discussions between 1474 and 1476, when virtually no such assemblies were recorded. It was precisely during those years that Matthias re-captured, by military and diplomatic acts, crusader glory, much to the dissatisfaction of the Habsburgs and Jagiellonians. It is rather clear that neither Frederic III, nor Casimir IV were true champions of Christendom. This was to become even more clear during the mid and late 1480' when the real Ottoman concerns of the two, namely those of Casimir IV mounted (not without Matthias' direct and indirect contribution). Nevertheless, the local context too dictated their quite weak or formal *Christian* stands<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> E.g. ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 26, cc. 22r, 31r-32v 101r-v (5<sup>th</sup> of July, 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1473, 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1474); FRAKNÓI (Vilmos), *Mátyás király levelei. Küllügyi Osztály* [King Matthias' Letters. Foreign Section], I, Budapest, 1893-1895 (MKL), 2 volumes, I, no. 200, p. 284; IORGA (Nicolae), *Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Bucharest, 1899-1916 (*Notes*); 6 volumes, IV, no. 281, p. 354; MDE, II, no. 158, p. 221; no. 162, pp. 224-225; nos. 176-177, pp. 251-258; PONTIERI (Ernesto), *Per la Storia del Regno di Ferrante I d'Aragona, re di Napoli*, Naples, 1969, pp. 167-170; KALOUS (Antonin), *Italská politika, Matyáš Korvín a české země* [Italian Politics, Matthias Corvinus and the Czech Lands], in *Husitský Tábor* (Tábor), XV (2006), pp. 149-176; IDEM, *Matthias Corvinus and the Papal Legates*, in *Between Worlds*, IV.

<sup>13</sup> STAVRIDIS (Theocharis), *The Sultan of the Viziers. The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vizir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474)*, Leiden-Boston-Cologne, 2001, pp. 232-234; EHM (Peter), *Burgund und das Reich. Spätmittelalterliche Außenpolitik am Beispiel der Regierung Karls des Kühnen (1465-1477)*, München, 2002, pp. 118-123; SIMON (Alexandru), *În jurul bătăliei de la Vaslui (1474-1475). Considerații asupra relațiilor dintre Regatul Ungariei, Moldova și Țara Românească* [Around the Battle of Vaslui. 1474-1475. On the Relations between the Kingdom of Hungary, Moldavia and Walachia], in *Studia Universitatis Babeș-*

In regional affairs, due to the anti-Ottoman plans too, Poland was in more difficult position than even Matthias' Hungary. Venice's (and Rome's too, to a lesser degree) plans to use the Volga Tartars (Great Horde) and Muscovite Russians against the *Turk* meant that these traditional adversaries had to cross the lands of Casimir IV. Moreover, after her plan of 1459-1460 to settle the Teutons on the island of Tenedos had failed and in spite of the fact that by the peace of Torun (1466) the knights were her vassals, Krakow (Kraków, Krakau) feared crusader foul-play in the case of their Baltic rivals, still under the patronage of the papacy and of the emperor (such a fear became reality when later Sixtus IV appointed Matthias as protector of the knights). A matter of great concern was also the fate of the former Russia Minor and Moldavia, now under the direct or indirect control of the Polish crown, which had been the object of numerous feuds between Buda and Krakow since the days of Louis (Lajos) I of Anjou and Casimir III. In particular, the vassal Moldavia was a problem in this crusader context. Stephen III had constantly avoided paying homage in person to Casimir IV and started restoring his ties to Matthias (1470-1471), due also to the domestic Moldavian plotting and to Tartar challenges, menaces in front of which Casimir seemed powerless or could even be suspected, not without cause, of supporting<sup>14</sup>.

Sixtus IV resorted to menacing Poland and Hungary with the papal interdict as long as the two kings did not come to terms. Matthias was unwilling to leave the Bohemian war with only that which he had achieved so far. Frederic III's recognition of Wladislaw (Władysław), recognition accepted by the *Reichstag* in January 1475), Casimir's oldest son, as king of Bohemia, after refusing to do the same for Matthias, the crowned king of Bohemia (1469), who had entered the land as Paul II's and Frederic's champion, only increased Matthias' refusal of any settlement that was not concluded to his clear advantage. In relation to Krakow, he had gained the political high-ground after the failed Polish intervention of 1471. He wanted to keep pressuring Vienna and Krakow by making use of Rome's and Venice's crusader needs or Burgundian ambition. He obviously neglected the fact that Rome

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*Bolyai. Historia* (Cluj-Napoca) XLIX (2004), 2, pp. 9-10. For the *Reichstage*, see the index of the volumes in the *Regesten Friedrich* collection (in particular: IV, no. 422, p. 240; no. 424, p. 241; no. 431, p. 247; no. 452, p. 253; no. 453; no. 254; no. 805, p. 390; no. 817, p. 398; no. 818, p. 400; XV, no. 364, p. 244). For the 1480': MDE, III, no. 71, p. 89; nos. 98-99, pp. 134-136; no. 111, p. 174; WOLF (Susanne), *Die Doppel-regierung Kaiser Friedrich III. und König Maximilians 1486-1493*, Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 2005, pp. 151-152.

<sup>14</sup> *Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, edited by TOEPPEN (Martin), V, Leipzig, 1886, nos. 107-109, pp. 317-319; MDE, II, no. 170-173, pp. 239-249; no. 179, p. 259; no. 183, p. 263; IV, Appendix, pp. 293-295; no. 10, p. 304; *Notes*, IV, no. 180, p. 271; no. 281, p. 354; HECK (Roman), *Polen und das Friedensprojekt Georgs von Podiebrad*, in *Cultus Pacis. Études et documents du Symposium pragense Cultus Pacis 1464-1964 Commemoratio Pacis Generalis ante quingentos annos a Georgio Bohemiae rege propositae*, edited by VANĚČEK (Václav), Prague, 1966, pp. 97-107; DĄBROWSKA (Mágorzata), *From Poland to Tenedos. The Project of Using the Teutonic Order in the Fight against the Turks after the Fall of Constantinople*, in *Byzanz und Mitteleuropa 950-1453. Beiträge zu einer table-ronde des XIX International Congress of Byzantine Studies, Copenhagen 1996*, edited by PRINZING (Günther) and SALAMON (Maciej), Wiesbaden, 1999, pp. 165-176; NEHRING, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 38-44, 59-61, 66-76.

wanted control over Bohemia, at least on the formal level. Sixtus IV realized that Bohemia had to be pacified. Due to the previous events (1468-1469), which had not helped his northern popularity or rule, Matthias was unable to give the papacy that extensive control or peace. By their recognition of local freedoms and by cleverly exploiting local resentment against Matthias, Casimir and Wladislaw were the only ones able to provide Sixtus IV with that kind of peace. Still, it was not until the end of his pontificate that Sixtus IV actually recognized Wladislaw as king (1482-1483), despite previous arrangements and promises<sup>15</sup>.

Though the northern and southern contexts, did not allow Rome to take any decisive steps into settling these affairs, its pressures added to the fact that now side was strong enough to win and thus determined a new series of peace talks. Carried on throughout the entire year 1474, with interruptions nevertheless, caused namely by Matthias' negotiating tactics, the peace talks, which eventually had no lasting major influence, on the actual problems, assured in return a re-lative political calm in the area. As these talks were carried on in the name and in the *desire* of a future great campaign against the Ottomans, Rome and Venice had the opportunity to intensify their crusader negotiations with each of the regional rivals. In theory, everybody was ready to fight Mehmed II. Once the opportunity presented itself after a year of almost constant terrestrial successes (though not of the same value, on the Christian-Infidel level as the Ottoman conquest of Caffa) against the Porte along the Lower Danube, from Sabač to Chilia (January 1475-February 1476), it became very clear that such an endeavor was highly unlikely. Casimir IV and Frederic III formed an alliance against Matthias on the grounds of the 'crusader neglect' and 'anti-Ottoman incompetence' of Hunyadi's son. By the end of summer 1476 and of Mehmed II's Moldavian campaign, it was easier to picture a new local Christian war than a crusade. As it had happened in earlier years, it was thus rather nature that no major anti-Ottoman action was under-taken on the northern frontier of the Ottoman Empire until the last months of the next year<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> HÖFLER (Constantin), *Das kaiserliche Buch des Markgrafen Albrecht Achilles. Vorkurfürstliche Periode 1440-1470* (=Quellensammlung für fränkische Geschichte, II) (Bayreuth 1850), no. 107, p. 214; *Teleki*, XI, no. 477, p. 244; MDE, II, no. 144, p. 204; MKL, I, no. 36, p. 47; nos. 78-79, pp. 144-145, II, no. 143, p. 249; no. 162, p. 273; no. 169, p. 286; no. 192, p. 321; BACZKOWSKI (Krzysztof), *Walka Jagiellonów z Maciejem Korwinem o koronę czeską w latach 1471-1479* [The Conflict between the Jagiellonians and Matthias Corvinus for the Czech Crown. 1471-1479], Krakow, 1980, pp. 40-44, 74-75, 101-104. For the southern impact of the clashes: [DI MAURO GONDOLA (Giovanni)], *Cronice ulteriori di Ragusa, in Chronica Ragusina Junii Resti (ab origine urbis usque ad annum 1451) item Ioannis Gundulai 1451-1484* (=Monumenta spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, XXV, Scriptores, II), edited by NASIILIS (Speratus), Zagreb, 1893, pp. 377-381,

<sup>16</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., Potenze estere, *Venezia*, cart. 364, fasc. 3, nn; fasc. 5, nn (13<sup>th</sup> of March, 11<sup>th</sup> of May 1477); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 26, cc. 31<sup>r</sup>-32<sup>v</sup>, 101<sup>r-v</sup> (13<sup>th</sup> of September 1473, 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1474); *Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*, edited by WEISE (Erich), III, Marburg, 1966, no. 467, pp. 85-87; *Teleki*, XII, no. 612, pp. 47-49; MKL, I, no. 253, pp. 373-374; see also SIMON (Alexandru), *Stephen the Great and his Involvement in Transylvania*, in *Transylvanian Review* (Cluj Napoca) XIII (2004), pp. 41-42. Further archival data on 1475 and 1476: ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere,

### 3. Eastern Legacies and Concerns

Underneath the great negotiations and plans there were some structural regional and in particular Hungarian aspects which bore an equally great influence on these crusader out-comes. In the mid 1460', Venice and Buda, allies against the Porte, competed for peace with the sultan. With support from Frederic, his friend at the time, Matthias had also an anti-Otto-man action in planning. In front of the Venetian envoys, Mehmed presented Matthias as a dis-loyal and corrupt politician, who made promises to all sides. After the Transylvanian rebellion and his failed Moldavian campaign, which ended his southern plans (1468), Matthias brought the same charges against Stephen III, who had been instrumental during the events. These events significantly contributed to the fact that more than a decade after his death, Hunyadi was still his son's most valuable symbolical crusader asset. The Bosnian campaigns, Hungary's *bulwark* status and Roman common praises assured Mathias a deserved crusader individuality, but not uniqueness. He had already surpassed his father in terms of charges of Ottoman dea-lings. For this he could not compensate by titles such as *athlete*, though Rome, in order to halt his (natural) financial claims, had exploited his desire to be Christendom's *only hope*<sup>17</sup>.

Namely in the 1440', Hunyadi was the only one who could have claimed such an honor. But he was no ruler from *god's grace*. In return, it was *Janko*, at a political low at that time (late 1453-early 1456), not his son, who was viewed by the Greeks of his entourage as the *emperor, successor of the Romans*. It was thus quite natural that, after 1453, *Turks* viewed a *Janko*, the leader of the *Magyars*, of the northern *Benī asfer* nations, as the mythical founder of Byzantium. This was a great Ottoman compliment rendered to the *athlete* Hunyadi. Though until the Reichstag speech of his messengers in late 1479, Matthias did not make use of the *Walachian ancestors* of Mehmed II in order to promote his blood-ties with the sultan, both he and his adversaries, namely after his failed Moldavian campaign of 1467, had spread rumors on the great political and matrimonial deals offered to him by Mehmed. It could well be that the early 1470' were more than a

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*Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn (14<sup>th</sup> of February); *Roma*, cart. 79, fasc. 5, nn (14<sup>th</sup> of September 1475); *Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. 1, nn (29<sup>th</sup> of May); *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 2, nn (20<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1476); *Venezia*, cart. 361, fasc. 2, nn (9<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> of February 1475 *More Veneto*=1476); fasc. 3, nn (28<sup>th</sup> of February, 5<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1475); cart. 362, fasc. 5, 9, nn (24<sup>th</sup> of May, 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1476).

<sup>17</sup> E.g. *Mathiae Corvini Hungariae Regis epistolae ad Romanos Pontifices datae et ab eis acceptae* (= *Monumenta Vaticana historiam Regni Hungariae illustrantia*, I, 6), edited by FRAKNÓI (Vilmos), Budapest, 1891 (EMC), no. 3, p. 6; no. 13, pp. 17-18; no. 19, p. 26; no. 45, p. 67; MDE, I, no. 213, p. 348; no. 211, p. 342; II, no. 31, p. 52; no. 56, p. 89; MKL, I, no. 149, p. 212; *Notes*, IV, nos. 162-179, pp. 250-270; *Regesten Friedrich*, XV, no. 212, p. 164; [ANGIOELLO (Giovanni Maria)] DA LEZZE (Donado), *Historia Tur-chesca*, edited by URSU ([Joan]), Bucharest, 1910, p. 84 (*Historia*); *Malipiero*, p. 40; PALL, *I rapporti italo-albanesi*, pp. 123-226; INALCIK (Halil), *The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1451-1522*, in *A History of the Crusades*, general editor SETTON (Kenneth M.), VI, Philadelphia, 1989, pp. 317-325; see here also the data in VON PALOMBINI (Barbara), *Bündniswerben abendländischer Mächte um Persien, 1453-1600*, Wiesbaden, 1968, pp. 14-21.

prequel to the Djem crisis. 'Otherwise', Thuróczy could not have printed the alleged statement of Mehmed. According to the sultan, Matthias was his only equal (1488). Still as in the case of the Transylvanian rebellion, when a Milanese report had even stated that the king thought to settle the matter of the *Szekler rebellion* quickly, for his father *Brancho* had been one of the them, there were many crusader aspects that did not work the same as they had done in Hunyadi's days, in particular on the royal eastern flank<sup>18</sup>.

Since Hunyadi's death, Transylvania had not taken center stage in anti-Ottoman actions. Even in his time, Transylvanian anti-Ottoman involvement had been a problem. The problem itself dated in fact far back to the rule of Sigismund of Luxemburg, to his royal troubles at the turn of the century. During Matthias' first 15 years of rule, Ottoman raids had been viewed, in an altogether exaggerated fashion, as devastations of Transylvania. However, also on the basic level of the relations between Buda and Istanbul, the Transylvania zone was no real priority, in terms of war (until 1493 no actual major Ottoman attack aimed precisely at the province took place), but not in those of late medieval diplomacy. Due namely to the flexible policies of the Saxon cities towards Mehmed II and his favorite Radu III of Walachia, Transylvania had grown into a communication channel between Buda and Istanbul. This feature of the voivodate, mainly in its southern areas, best came to light during the rules of Basarab III, Basarab IV and Vlad IV (mid 1470'-early 1480'). This political feature had been noticed in the late 1430' or early 1450', at times when Transylvania should have played a rather different part in the south-eastern policy of the realm. Transylvania turned from a major anti-Ottoman factor into a balance factor between colliding powers, which had crucial effects on regional anti-Ottoman warfare. As, due to the regional importance of the areas and especially of Belgrade, Hungarian-Ottoman conflicts concentrated in former Bosnia and Serbia, Buda could rarely make use of its eastern flank<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> In these matters, e.g. ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Venezia*, cart. 354, fasc. 2, nn (18<sup>th</sup> of Februa-ry 1468); BOGDAN (Ioan), *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare* [The Documents of Stephen the Great], II, Bucharest, 1913, no. 135, p. 304; *Notes*, V, no. 73, p. 55; *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanae*, IV, edited by MIHĂILESCU (Horațiu), LĂZĂRESCU (Radu), TANAȘOCA (Nicolae-Șerban), TEOTEOI (Tudor), Bucharest, 1982, pp. 392-397 (*Zotikos Paraspondylos*), *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken (Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman). Text und Varianten*, edited by GIESE (Friederich), Breslau-Leipzig, 1922-1925; 2 volumes, I, pp. 55-56; II, pp. 72-73; [THURÓCZI/ THURÓCZY (János)] Johannes de Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, Budapest, 1985-1988; 3 volumes, I, edited by GALÁNTAI (Erzsebet), KRISTÓ (Gyula), pp. 285-286; PAPACOSTEA (Șerban), *Un epi-sode de la rivalité polono-hongroise au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle: l'expédition de Matia Corvin en Moldovie (1467) à la lumière d'une nouvelle source*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* (Bucharest), VIII (1969), 6, p. 977; YERASIMOS (Stéphane), *Enquête sur un héros: Yanko bin Madyan, le fondateur mythique de Constantinople*, in *Mélanges offerts à Louis Bazin par ses disciples, collègues et amis*, edited by BACQUÉ-GRAMMONT (Jean-Louis), DOR (Rémy), Paris, 1992, pp. 213-217; MUREȘAN (Dan Ioan), *Le Royaume de Hongrie et la prise de Constantinople: croisade et union ecclésiastique en 1453*, in *Between Worlds*, II, pp. 499-501.

<sup>19</sup> DE HURMUZAKI (Eudoxiu), *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor* [Documents regarding the History of the Romanians], Bucharest-Cernăuți, 1887-1942; 15 (17) toms/ 45 volumes, XV-1, no. 64, p. 37;

It seemed likelier to change this situation from the outside than from within the actual realm. Major, nevertheless temporary, alterations were brought to the Transylvanian status by Moldavian means. The conflict between Moldavia and Walachia was instrumental in this re-spect. It had re-irrupted at the end of the 1460'. The feud, at the time, between Radu III and Stephen III, involved both the zone of the Danube Mounds and Moldavia's Lower Country. It was a major challenge for Buda, for it touched the important areas of the Transylvanian Szeklers and Saxons, and for the Porte, as the fighting put an end to the equilibrium between her and Hungary's 'buffer states' of Walachia and Moldavia. The situation was particularly tense after, in 1471, Matthias sided, once again, as he had done also during the events of 1465-1466, with Stephen, his former enemy. Stephen refused to support the Polish attack on Matthias and offered his help to the king. At about the same time, the 'crusader *Reichstag*' of Regensburg, it had been stated that the *Walachians* would take arms against the *Turk*, in case king Matthias took the field against the sultan. This developing entente, a challenge for all their neighbors, had to overcome the major problems which existed between the two sides, despite the mutual agreements and official tokens of trust. The problems were best revealed in late 1474 when the *Hungarians* (i.e. Transylvanians) and Moldavians, which should fought together the Ottomans and the Walachian party loyal to the sultan, fought each other over the Walachian throne<sup>20</sup>.

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nos. 106-107, pp. 61-62; nos. 115-116, p. 66; nos. 123-124, pp. 70-71; no. 131, p. 75; no. 137, pp. 79-80; no. 141, p. 82; TOCILESCU (Grigore), *534 documente slavo-române din Țara Românească și Moldova privitoare la legăturile cu Ardealul. 1346-1603. Din arhivele orașelor Brașov și Bistrița* [534 Slavic-Romanian Documents from Walachia and Moldavia regarding the Relations to Transylvania. 1346-1603. From the Archives of the Cities Brașov (Kronstadt, Brassó) and Bistrița (Bistriz, Besztrece)], Bucharest, 1931, no. 130, p. 126; *Cronaca di Ser Guerriero da Gubbio dall'anno MCCCL all'anno MCCCCL XXII*, editor MAZZATINI (Giuseppe), in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* (Bologna-Città del Castello), NS, XXI (1902), 4, pp. 87-88; UNREST (Jakob), *Österreichische Chronik* (= *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, I, *Scriptores*, NS, 11), edited by GROSSMANN (Karl), Weimar 1957, p. 108; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 525, 537; for Walachia: XENOPOL (A[lexandru]. D[imitrie].), *Lupta între Drăculești și Dănești* [The Fight between the Houses of Dracul and Dan], in *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* [Annals of the Romanian Academy: Memoirs of the Historical Section] (Bucharest), 3<sup>rd</sup> series, XXX (1907-1908), pp. 207-211; for Transylvania: GÜNDISCH (Gustav) *Sieben-bürgen in der Türkenabwehr 1396-1526*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XIII (1974), 3, pp. 426-435.

<sup>20</sup> ASV, Misc., Arm., II-7, ff. 388 (392)<sup>r</sup>, 472 (476)<sup>v</sup> (6<sup>th</sup> of May, 13<sup>th</sup> of July 1472); HHStA, M.E.A., 1b, fasc. 1, ff. 157<sup>r</sup>-170<sup>r</sup> (14<sup>th</sup> of May 1471); 2, fasc. 1, ff. 32<sup>r</sup>, 40<sup>r</sup>-46<sup>r</sup> [May-June 1471]; *Urkundliche Nachträge zur Österreichisch-Deutschen Geschichte im Zeitalter Kaiser Friedrich III.* (= *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II, 46), edited by BACHMANN (Adolf), Vienna, 1892, no. 147, pp. 162-163; no. 255, p. 273; BOGDAN (Ioan), *Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul și Ungaria în secolele XV și XVI* [Documents regarding Walachia's Relations to Brașov (Kronstadt, Brassó) and Hungary in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Centuries], Bucharest, 1905, no. 272, p. 328; *Actae et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae Hungariaeque cum Moldavia et Valachia* (= *Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum*, IV, VI), edited by VERESS (Endre), I, Buda-pest 1914, nos. 30-31, pp. 31-33; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III.* (= *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*,

## II. Between Unlikely Support and Traditional Adversity

Crusaders efforts were viewed with rather polite contempt in the West in the 1470'. This led to the widening of gap between personal and collective statements of crusader passion and the 'behind the scenes' mocking of the idea. The real problem was not so much the fact that France, England and Burgundy too viewed the actions of Rome and the 'Eastern' Latins as money schemes (the *Reconquista* was viewed at times in similar fashion). The problem was that this point of view was shared and (well) defended in the central parts of Europe. In 1476, the 'invasion' of persistent Tartar, Walachian or Persian envoys caused Galeazzo Mario Sforza's public discontent. These *Easterners* had learnt *bad habits* from the *Hungarian*. Like Matthias, whose matrimonial propositions had previously been rejected by the Sforzas (1473-1474), the enemies of Ferdinand of Aragon, they promised great help in return for rather small sums. For-tunately for the crusade, there were counter-arguments. First, warfare costed less in the East. Second, Sforza, like other contesters of crusader action, but *politically correct* supporters of the idea (for instance, the Milanese-Florentine-Venetian alliance of November 1474, much disliked by Rome, as Sixtus IV viewed it as a direct challenge to his Italian and crusader authority) was an 'anti-Ottoman' alliance), was not a highly credible or very moral authority on the crusades<sup>21</sup>.

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A, XV-XXII), VIII-2, edited by WOLF (Helmut) Göttingen, 1999, nos. 94-95, pp. 323-32; MDE, II, no. 11, p. 20; no. 167, p. 233, EMC, no. 60, p. 80; no. 62, p. 82; *Hurmuzaki*, XV-1, no. 133, p. 77; CRIBELLI (Leodrisii), *De expeditione Pii Papae II adversus Turcos* (= *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XXIII, 5), edited by ZIMOLO (Giulio C. ), Bologna, 1950, p. 85; *Letopisețul anonim al Țării Moldovei* [The Anonymous Chronicle of the Land of Moldavia], *Cronica moldo-germană* [The Moldo-German Chronicle], in *Cronicile slavo-române din secolele XV-XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan* [The Slavic-Romanian Chronicles of the 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> Centuries edited by Ioan Bogdan], edited by PANAITESCU (P[etre]. P[etre].), Bucharest, 1959, pp. 15-17, 30-32; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 478, 510, 525, 537, 540, 550; SIMON, *Considerații*, pp. 5-9, 12-14, 20-21.

<sup>21</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Venezia*, cart. 362, fasc. 5, 9, nn (24<sup>th</sup> of May, 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1476; in MOTTA (Emilio), *Un ambasciatore tartaro a Venezia, 1476*, in *Ateneo Veneto* (Venise), XIX (1889), pp. 145-153); Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Könyvtár [The Library of the "Eötvös Loránd" University], Budapest (ELTEK), *Kézirattár* (Codices), *Kaprinai*, in 4<sup>o</sup>, LXVIII, nos. 4-5, pp. 11-12 (7<sup>th</sup> of September 1474); *Acta in consilio secreto in castello Portae Jovis Mediolani* (= *Acta Italica*, IV, IX, XVII), edited by NATALE (Alfio Rosario), II, 11 aprile 1478-22 dicembre 1478 (Milan 1964), pp. 311, 315 (12<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup> of November); [SANUDO IL GIOVANNE (Marino)], *Vitae Ducum Venetorum Italice feriptae ab origine Urbis, sive ab anno CCCCXXI usque ad annum MCCCCXCIII*, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XXIII (1733), col. 1183; IDEM, *Le vite dei dogi (1474-1494)*, edited by Angela Caracciolo Aricò (Padua 1989-2001), 2 volumes [continuous page numbering], pp. 41-45, 61; VAN BAMMER (Franklin), *England, the Turk and the Common Corps of Christendom*, in *American Historical Review* (New York), L (1944-1945), pp. 26-48; FUBINI (Riccardo), *La lega del 2 novembre 1474 tra Venezia, Milano e Firenze e i suoi preliminari*, in *Lorenzo de Medici, Lettere*, edited by FUBINI (Riccardo), II, 1474-1478, Florence, 1977, p. 488; PISTORESI (Marco), *Venezia-Milano-Firenze 1475. La visita in Laguna di Sforza Maria Sforza e le manovre della diplomazia internazionale: aspetti politici e ritualità pubblica*, in *Studi Veneziani* (Venise), XLVI (2003), pp. 31-69; EDWARDS (John), *Re-conquista and Crusade in Fifteenth Century Spain*, in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century*, pp. 172-175.

Only a few months after the Ottoman raid on Oradea, Matthias' first envoy was sent to Naples to request the hand of Beatrice of Aragon. Venice was fearful of the potential Italian consequences of the marriage, but avoided (seriously) undermining Matthias' credibility. The republic still needed him, though Matthias did not draw any closer to the Ottoman frontiers. Throughout 1473 and 1474, he remained in the northern parts of his realm. He did not go more to the East or the South, not even after Oradea was burnt. In fact, compelled namely by Bohemian warfare, the king had not crossed the Tisa (Tisza) river since the summer of the 1471 year of troubles. Until late 1475 and the Sabač campaign, Matthias Corvinus kept and had to keep his distance from the Hungarian neighborhoods of the Ottoman Empire. He tried to work through representatives, as risky as that proved even at the Diet following the events of February 1474. Matthias' *prefects*, during his absence from the realm, Imre (Emerich) Szapolyai (Zápolya) and Stephen (István) Báthory thus had increased powers. In particular the latter, royal court judge, started acting as a true governor of the eastern parts of the realm. The eastern role of Báthory further increased prior to his nomination as voivode of Transylvania in 1479. By 1477-1478, Báthory had already apparently developed his own Ottoman policy<sup>22</sup>.

## 1. The Ottoman Impact of the Walachian Conflicts

In 1472, Radu III was at odds with king Matthias, after the latter had used him, *the count of Walachia*, in order to bring to Hungary the Ottomans which had attacked the Habsburg estates and the Venetian mainland. In eastern affairs however, Matthias sided with Stephen III. Probably, Matthias was ready too to make his move on *Valacia*, whether with Stephen's aid or with Mehmed II's approval. Walachia was re-listed as a royal province in a remarkably accurate Florentine report of mid 1472, drafted for the Sforzas, on Hungarian revenues, provinces and elites. The same year, Matthias took great official pride in having overcome, meaning outlived, the treason of Walachia and Moldavia. The second one was now, with one foot, at his side, but also at that of Frederic, the other lawful king of Hungary since the treaties of 1463-1464, whose attention he had recaptured (after the events of 1466-1467), since probably 1471, by the troubles caused to

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<sup>22</sup> E.g. *Teleki*, XI, no. 560, pp. 510-511; no. 574, pp. 546-547 (eventually, Imre Szapolyai became the king's sole deputy). For an (preliminary) overview of king Matthias' itinerary, see HORVÁTH (Richárd), *The Warring King: The Itinerary of Matthias Corvinus*, in *Matthias Corvinus, the king: Tradition and Renewal in the Hungarian Royal Court. 1458-1490. Exhibition catalogue*, edited by FARBAKY (Péter), SPEKNER (Enikő), SZENDE (Katalin), VÉGH (András), Budapest, 2008, pp. 51-63; KUBINYI (András), *Die Staatsorganisation der Matthiaszeit*, in IDEM, *Matthias Corvinus: die Regierung eines Königreichs in Ostmitteleuropa (1458-1490)*, Herne, 1999, pp. 34-38; for the (anti-) Ottoman context of the time, see *Nachträge*, no. 280, p. 298; *Historia*, p. 59; *Kemal Paşa Zade*, p. 208; SIMON (Alexandru), *The Arms of the Cross: The Christian Politics of Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus*, in *Between Worlds*, I, p. 52; IDEM, *The Limits of the Moldavian Crusade (1474, 1484)*, in *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica*, IX, 2007, pp. 299-301.

Casimir IV and by the aid rendered to Matthias. Matthias' regional position was delicate also because, in that same year, 1472, Nicholas (Miklós) Újlaki had been crowned king of Bosnia in May, which further complicated Matthias' relations to Rome. His position influenced the eastern political steps of king Matthias' long-time ally and adversary<sup>23</sup>.

The fall of Negroponte (1471), the failure of the 'Muscovite plan' (1472), Uzun Hassan's defeat (1473), the difficult talks with the Tartars in view of their anti-Ottoman action (1473-1474), the even more difficult negotiations with Mehmed (in particular 1471-1473), the failed Ottoman 'palace coup' attempted by republic placed Venice in a delicate position. Her Italian relations were predominantly tense. The republic needed a success in the East. She needed at least some anti-Ottoman hope. At that time the rise of Matthias' Moldavian 'vassal' continued. In the summer-fall of 1472, Stephen III seems to have been on the list of major *Christian* figures addressed by Uzun Hassan for a common fight against the *Turk*. Mary of Mangop, Stephen III's wife, and Catherine Comnenos, Uzun's wife, were cousins. This made Stephen, whose wife was also related to Zoe Palaeologus, Ivan III of Moscow's fiancée and future wife, more trustworthy in Uzun's eyes. Nevertheless, both from the East and the West, Matthias was the main East-Central European partner for any anti-Ottoman talks. Yet, Venice's relation to him had been rather poor, since the failed German-Hungarian crusader plan of 1466-1467. Still, he was the one most likely to provide this success for her. Casimir IV was on friendly terms with the sultan and at odds with Matthias. Stephen III was equally a promise and a liability for the crusade, due to his previous actions and changes of policy, namely in 1462 and in 1467<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Ungheria*, cart. 645, fasc. 2, nn (edited by KOVÁCS (Péter E.), *A leg gazdabb Magyarok 1472-ben. Egy követjelentés és a valóság* [The Richest Hungarians in 1472. An Embassy and its Historic Value], in *Századok* [Centuries] (Budapest), CXXXIX (2005), 2, p. 428); ELTEK, *Kaprinai*, B, LXVIII, no. 6, p. 13 (1<sup>st</sup> of November 1472); pp. 251-257; *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, VI, edited by GÜNDISCH (Gustav), GÜNDISCH (Hertha), NUSSBÄCHER (Gernot), GÜNDISCH (Konrad), Bucharest, 1981 no. 3843, p. 479; *Teleki*, XI, no. 289, p. 470; MDE, II, nos. 176-177, *Hurmuzaki*, XV-1, no. 138, p. 80; for further details, see *Documente Braşov*, no. 272, p. 328; MKL I, no. 77, p. 111; no. 189, p. 266; *Regesten Friedrich*, suppl. II-1, no. 3539, p. 523; *Bonfini* (1936-1941), IV, pp. 31-32.

<sup>24</sup> *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae*, edited by DOGIEL (M[atthias].), I, Vinius, 1758, nos. 21-24, pp. 65-68; THALLÓCZY (Lajos), *Frammenti relativi alla storia dei paesi situati all'Adria* (offprint *Archaeografo Triestino*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, VII, 1913, 1), Trieste, 1913, p. 18; CORNET (Enrico), *Le guerre dei Veneti nell'Asia, 1470-1474. Documenti cavati dall'Archivio ai Frari in Venezia* (Vienna 1856), no. 90, p. 112; MAKUSEV (Viaceslav), *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalum vicinorumque populorum e tabularis et bibliothecis italicis derompta*, I-2, Warsaw, 1874, no. 14, p. 46; MDE, II, no. 170, p. 239; MKL, I, no. 211, p. 296; *Hustinskaja lietopiś* [The Chronicle of Hust], in *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum* (Krakow), II (1874), p. 304; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 597-600, 602-603; RÁZSÓ, (Gyula), *Una strana alleanza. Alcuni pensieri sulla storia militare e politica dell'alleanza contro i turchi (1440-1464)*, in *Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento*, edited by BRANCA (Vittore), Florence, 1973, pp. 95-101; GANCHOU (Thierry), *Une Kantakouzène, impératrice de Trébizonde: Théodôra ou Hélène?*, in *Revue des Études Byzantines* (Paris), LVIII

Matthias had not the best of images in Venice. Further to the East, the fate of the Venetian-Ottoman affair was, more or less, in the hands of *Barbarians*, Tartars or Walachians. They were even more unreliable than the king. Moreover, to the East Matthias would have had to rely in these matters on the astute Stephen III. Between (1465) 1466-1467, Stephen had been both Matthias', though he was already, on the Christian side, Casimir's vassal, and Mehmed's vassal. In return for his support for Matthias' Ottoman plans, he had been (formally) granted estates. In 1465, by Walachian means, he had been disloyal to Mehmed II. In 1467, by Transylvanian means, he had been disloyal to Matthias. In 1465, he took, to Matthias' profit too, Chilia from the Walachian 'representatives' of the sultan. In 1467, Stephen's former 'allegiance' almost costed Matthias his life. These were no tokens of Stephen III's crusader reliability. Venice tried, on the diplomatic level, to look around them, as in the 1460' in case of Matthias relation to Bosnia and *Herzegovina*, whose rulers had constantly accused him of greed and treason. Still, Matthias stood less and less for an enduring option for Venice. This best came to light after the Walachian-Moldavian turned into an unexpected anti-Ottoman victory<sup>25</sup>.

The stakes of the Walachian-Moldavian war, started in 1470, were the trade routes between the West and the Danube Mounds. From the perspective of the future events of 1473-1476, in light of which Stephen's earlier attacks could also be viewed as pressures put on the Porte, Mehmed II should have abandoned Radu and accepted Stephen's control of the routes. Due to his war with Uzun Hassan, Mehmed II postponed a final decision on the matter. At the time, trapped in his ongoing Bohemian war and forced to install Nicholas Újlaki, his former enemy, as king of the vassal state of Bosnia (1471-1472), Matthias applied similar tactics in his relation to the Porte. Mehmed II tried to gain time by offering him peace, which added to Sixtus' IV Hungarian worries. In fact, as the Walachian crisis unfolded, Mehmed II had no intention of giving in to Matthias. After the events of 1471, when it was even claimed that Matthias would attack Frederic III with aid from *Turks, Serbians and Walachians*, which led to Casimir IV's response that, in fact, he had Stephen III's support against king Matthias, it had become clear that only a major Christian-Ottoman arrangement, in the later fashion of the 1490' and early 1500', or a major clash could lead to a political settlement in area. It seemed that while, to the West,

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(2000), pp. 218-219; NEHRING, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 24-26, 33-34; SIMON, *The Arms of the Cross*, pp. 51-52, 66-68.

<sup>25</sup> E.g. ASV, Arm. XXXIX-10, ff. 256 (276)<sup>r</sup>-257 (277)<sup>v</sup> [1459-1460; cf. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, p. 262 (note 111); SIMON, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 483-484]; ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 21, c. 219<sup>r</sup> (31<sup>st</sup> of December 1463); Biblioteca Capitular Colombiana, Seville, Codices, Section 82, mss. 4-8, *Joannis Pannonii Vitesii episcopi Quinque Ecclesiarum Silvaruni Liber et Epistolae*, f. 94<sup>v</sup> (2<sup>nd</sup> of January 1467; copy: MOL, DF 290346); VALENTINI (Giuseppe), *Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV et XV, Pars tertia, Saeculi XV Scanderbegianam periodum complectens*, XXIV, Munich, 1977, no. 7240, p. 485; MHS, I-2, no. 4, p. 166; no. 5, p. 190; MDE, I, no. 23, p. 33; no. 162, p. 224; II, no. 13, p. 25; *Frammenti*, p. 11; MKL, I, no. 62, p. 83; no. 77, p. 110; *Ulb.*, VI, no. 3544, p. 294; *Długosz* (1887), p. 478.

king Matthias was favoring the first solution, the Walachian conflict and the Venetian promises made in the East pushed towards the second solution. In spite of the problems and costs he faced already by Ottoman hand, Stephen III did not send his tribute due for the year 1472 to Istanbul. Caught in his bitter war with Uzun Hassan, where he had suffered great losses, Mehmed II avoided diverting his attention to an area, known for its dysfunctional Christian political (crusader or not) relations from which he and his father had profited<sup>26</sup>.

## 2. Defeat to the East and Hope to the West

In August 1473, Uzun Hassan's army was crushed. Rome's and Venice's eastern crusader hopes suffered a terrible blow. Mehmed II was able to toy with Matthias' envoys that had come to him in the king's hope to profit from Mehmed's troubles. Soon after, the palace coup that Venice had tried to stage in Istanbul was also out of the question. Mehmed II could turn on Venetian Scutari and retake control over the Walachian affairs. The crusader odds seemed more than unfavorable. Still, in November 1473, after an apparent one year truce with Mehmed II's favorite Radu III, Stephen III re-entered Walachia, when he, confronted like the king of Hungary, with major domestic problems, should have kept a rather low profile in order to avoid Ottoman punishment. For this attack, Stephen III had received promises and less substantial sums of money, a fact for which he later constantly blamed Rome and Buda. The main author of the attack was Venice, whose Greek advisor and captain, John TzAMPLAKON Palaeologus, Mary of Mangop's uncle, Stephen III's wife since the fall of 1472, had become Stephen's councilor. Regardless of what Matthias initially thought of all these plans, at the end of 1473, it had become clear that Buda could lose control (in Walachia's case) or influence (in Moldavia's case) over its south-eastern flank, in case Stephen III's action backfired. The

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<sup>26</sup> E.g. PRIEBATSCH (Felix), *Politische Correspondenz des Kurfürsten Albrecht Achilles, 1470-1486*, I, 1470-1474 (=Publikationen aus den Königlichen Preussischen Staatsarchiven, LIX), Leipzig, 1894, no. 721, pp. 555-556; *Korrespondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus* (=Scriptores Rerum Sile-siacarum, XIII-XIV), edited by KRONTHAL (Berthold), WENDT (Heinrich), I, 1469-1479, Breslau, 1893, no. 59, p. 37; Tursun Bey (2007), p. 229; *Letopisețul anonim* (1958), p. 16; GUBOGLU (Mihail), *Le tribut payé par les Principautés Roumaines à la Porte jusqu'au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle d'après les sources turques*, in *Revue des Études Islamiques* (Paris), XXXVII (1969), 1, pp. 68-70; see further BABINGER (Franz), *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit. Weltenstürmer einer Zeitenwende*, Munich, 1959<sup>2</sup>, pp. 373-374; MUNSEN (Randal), *Stephen the Great: Leadership and Patronage on the Fifteenth Century Ottoman Frontier*, in *East-European Quarterly* (Boulder), XXXIX (2005), 3, pp. 269-297; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, pp. 304, 320-321; see further: TARDY (Lajos), *Beyond the Ottoman Empire. 14<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> Century Hungarian Diplomacy*, Szeged, 1978, pp. 58-59; SIMON, *Considerații*, pp. 9, 19; PAPACOSTEA, *Politica externă*, pp. 22-25.

king had to take a more determined anti-Ottoman stand, which he also probably quickly did<sup>27</sup>.

In late 1473, Stephen had two major targets: the dethronement of Radu, something which he had not attempted earlier, and the creation of a new anti-Ottoman front, meant to relieve pressure from the besieged city of Scutari. The first goal was quickly achieved. Radu III was replaced with Basarab III, prepared by Stephen III for the throne since 1472, but lost his crown only a month later. After the Ottomans re-installed Radu as ruler and raided southern Moldavia, it became known that if Stephen re-attacked Walachia, the *Turk* would levy the siege of Scutari and turn against Moldavia. Venice had already promised Matthias 30000 ducats if he succeeded in diverting the Ottoman attack on Scutari. In the fall of 1474, king Matthias' messengers sent to Venice cashed in only half of the amount. The other half had probably been sent to Stephen, alongside other smaller subsidies, as he had not been discouraged by the anti-Ottoman course of events. In spring 1474, he re-entered Walachia, but could not keep his grip over the land. He tried again in August and October and failed. By November, he seemed to have pushed his relation with the Porte to the point of no return, in spite of Mehmed's rather questionable offers of pardon for his actions. Though rumors spread about an arrangement between the sultan and Stephen, in November, for the first time, as far as it is known, a joint Hungarian-Moldavian anti-Ottoman action was staged. By then, the Ottoman troops had left the siege of Scutari and were on the road to Moldavia. Earlier on, due to the ongoing Venetian-Ottoman talks, the persisting uncertainties in Asia Minor and the hope of still taking Scutari, Mehmed II had hesitated to great another major front north of the Danube<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 3, nn (23<sup>rd</sup> of May 1476; a summary of Mehmed's Moldavian demands); IORGA (Nicolae), *Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor* [Documents and Fragments on the History of the Romanians], III, Bucharest, 1897, pp. 54-55; DRAGOMIR (Silviu), *Documente nouă privitoare la relațiile Țării românești cu Sibiul în secolii XV și XVI* [New Documents regarding Walachia's Relations to Sibiu in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Centuries], Cluj, 1927, nos. 1-2, pp.11-12; *Documente Ștefan*, II, nos. 146-150, pp. 331-339; MDE, II, no. 183, p. 263; *Hurmuzaki*, II-1, no. 5, p. 4; MKL, I, no. 211, p. 296; *Guerre*, no. 43, p. 44; no. 85, p. 106; no. 90, p. 112; *Notes*, IV, no. 275, p. 352; *Letopisețul anonim* (1958), pp 17-18; *Cronica moldo-germană* (1958), pp. 30-32; HALÉVY (Mayer J.), *Les guerres de Etienne le Grand et d'Uzun Hasan d'après la "Chronique de la Turquie du candiote Elie Capsali (1520)"*, in *Studia et Acta Orientalia* (Bucharest), I (1957), pp. 190-193; SIMON (Alexandru), *Quello ch'è apresso el Turcho. About A Son of Stephen the Great*, in *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Ricerca e Cultura Umanistica*, VII (2005), pp. 141-169; MUREȘAN, *Girolamo Lando*, pp. 172-174, 183-185.

<sup>28</sup> ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 26, cc. 22r, 31r 101r-v (5<sup>th</sup> of July, 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1473, 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1474); Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Codices, cod. 6216, MAGNO (Stefano), *Annali veneti e del mondo* [1443-1478], *Ad annum 1473*, ff. 561r-v, 575r-576v [May, October-November]; GELICH (József), THALLÓCZY (Lajos), *Diplomatarium relationum reipublicae regasane cum regno Hungariae. Ragusa és Magyarorszáig összeköttetéseinek oklevéltára*, Budapest, 1887, no. 385, p. 631; *I libri commemoriali della Republica di Venezia. Regesti* [edited by PREDELLI (Riccardo)], V, [Registri XIV-XVII], Venice 1901, no. XVI-65, 73, pp. 213, 215; *Frammenti*, p. 24; NAVAGERO (Andrea), *Storia della Repubblica Veneziana*, in

By his actions, Stephen was taking care of Venice's eastern interests. His fights captured, by (mainly) Venetian means, the attention of the Italian Peninsula and gave way for new hopes for an anti-Ottoman return of Usun Hassan too. The optimistic tone of such reports (January-February 1474), partially motivated by the time spans needed by information to travel from the front line to the center, was contradicted by the events. Some reports were pure fiction intended to support Venice's case, to show that the *Christian* cause still had a chance. The inventions backfired in early 1475, when quite many in the Italian Peninsula refused to believe the news of Stephen's victory of Vaslui. The victory in itself was largely the product of compromise and treason, covered up by glamorous reports and by the proud statements made by Stephen and his not yet official suzerain Matthias, who already fought over the political and financial spoils of victory. The compromise of November 1474 (after the Hungarian and Moldavian troops fought each other in Walachia, victorious Stephen III agreed to back down and to allow Basarab IV, the Hungarian candidate for the throne to be installed, in return for some 7000 soldiers who were sent to his aid) and the treason of the Walachian troops at Vaslui (Basarab III, abandoned by Stephen two months earlier, had sided with the Ottomans, but when the battle tide began to turn in favor of the Christians, he struck the Ottoman army from behind) were instrumental in assuring the greatest Christian victory over the Ottomans since the Belgrade (1456)<sup>29</sup>.

It is interesting to note that, in the Italian Peninsula, basically until the end of 1474, the data on the Walachian war was viewed (and 'analyzed') predominantly separately from the information on anti-Ottoman warfare. Though in general 'Central European' information were placed in a different category than the 'southern' (*Turkish*) news and reports, the fact that on very few occasions a direct link was established between the

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*Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XXIII (1733), cols. 1142-1144; *Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese 1446-1488*, edited by SORANZO (Giovanni), Venice, 1915, p. 307; HYVANI SARZANENSIS (Antonio), *Historia de volaterrana calamitate* (= *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, NS, XXIII, 4), edited by MANNUCCI (Francesco Luigi), Città di Castello, 1913, pp. 42-43; Aşık Paşa Zade, Mehmed Neşri, in *Cronici turceşti*, I, pp. 95-96, 127-128; *Cronica moldo-ger-mană* (1958), pp. 31-32; Malipiero, pp. 41-43; SIMON, Ştefan cel Mare şi Matia Corvin, pp. 209-210.

<sup>29</sup> ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. [3], nn (16<sup>th</sup> of January 1474); *Ungheria*, cart. 649, fasc. [2], nn (15<sup>th</sup> of February 1474); *Venezia*, cart. 361, fasc. 3, nn (25<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1474, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1475); HHStA, S.A., A.D.S., *Hungarica*, A.A., I-2, fasc. 2-4, f. 30<sup>r-v</sup> [March-April 1474; copy: MOL, DF 276099]; IORGA (Nicolae), *Veneţia în Marea Neagră. III. Originea legă-turilor cu Ştefan cel Mare şi mediul politic al dezvoltării lor* [Venice <'s Involvement> in the Black Sea <Area>], in IDEM, *Studii asupra evului mediu românesc* [Studies on the Romanian Middle Ages], editor PAPACOSTEA (Şerban), Bucharest, 1984, pp. 241-244; MDE, II, no. 209, pp. 301-302; *Actae*, no. 16, p. 17; no. 34, p. 37; *Acte*, III, p. 54; Malipiero, pp. 99-100; *Vite 1474-1494*, pp. 11-12; PAPACOSTEA (Şerban), *Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen Age*, in *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, editor Agostino PERTUSI, I-2, *Storia-Diritto-Economia* (Florence 1973), pp. 602-603; SIMON (Alexandru), *The Use of the Gate of Christendom. Hungary's Mathias Corvinus and Moldavia's Stephen the Great Politics in the late 1400's*, in *Quaderni della Casa Romana di Venezia* (Venise), III (2004), pp. 204-206; IDEM, *The Arms of the Cross*, pp. 48-50.

Walachian events and the general anti-Ottoman context comes into contradiction with the massive amount of secret data and reports that went around in those days. The only sources which did establish a direct connection between these aspects came almost exclusively from an Genoese (Chios, Caffa) or Venetian (Candia or the city of St. Mark) environment, not from a proper continental Italian or 'Central European' milieu. It would be as if these events and their diplomatic background really became known only when Venice wanted them to become public, as news from other places (Ragusa) could be labeled as just rumors. The only time news on a (false) Moldavian victory over the *Turk* reached the peninsula via a 'terrestrial' channel was in late February and in March 1474, when (repeated) news were sent from Venice to Milan that, according to the Venetian ambassador in Buda, the *Walachians* had won a great victory over the Ottomans. At that time, not only Stephen, but also Venice and, in particular, Matthias were in a very tight spot<sup>30</sup>.

### 3. Local and Regional Structural Limits

In early spring 1474, Hungarian-Venetian news on the *Walachian* victory (victory for which Stephen III himself never took credit) was not only a cover-up for local anti-Ottoman failures in the aim of furthering the crusader hopes. It was also a cover-up for Hungarian misfortunes. In February 1474, the *Turks* had burnt and ravaged Oradea (Nagyvarad, Grosswardein), a small Hungarian Saint-Denis. Very few information on this event reached the Italian peninsula even though the royal and popular effect of the raid was huge. Matthias Corvinus' already contested domestic prestige had been dealt a considerable blow. He managed to turn the tables in his favor and pushed the Hungarian Diet to approve the 1 florin tax *per porta*, even under the reserve that the money thus collected was to be used only against the *Turk*. The king accomplished the same on the foreign level, where he made the most for himself out of the Walachian attacks of Stephen III of Moldavia. In fact, it had been Matthias and not the Moldavian ruler who had been 'severely punished' by the sultan for the Moldavian campaign of November 1473. As the Ottoman sources go, Mehmed II's aim was to plant new seeds of discontent amongst Matthias' subject and to teach him a lesson. On regional level,

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<sup>30</sup> In general ASG, A.S., *Diversorum Communis Januae*, 3055, nn (11<sup>th</sup> of January 1474); ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. [3], nn (16<sup>th</sup> of January 1474); *Ungheria*, cart. 649, fasc. 2, nn (15<sup>th</sup> of February, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1474); *Venezia*, cart. 361, fasc. 3, nn (25<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1474); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 26, c. 101<sup>r</sup> (15<sup>th</sup> of June 1474); *Nachträge*, no. 234, p. 257; no. 251, p. 266; no. 55, p. 273; no. 280, p. 298; SIMON (Alexandru), *Anti-Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda in 1474: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XLVI (2007), 1-4, pp. 25-39; Nehring, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 61, 188; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, pp. 204, 213, 315-321.

Matthias was viewed by the sultan as the main responsible for the Moldavian attack on Walachia<sup>31</sup>.

In return, Matthias had other concerns and several limitations to face. Venice only agreed to pay him for his actions after she saw some results. She knew she could not trust him for long and so did the king Venice shaped the 'crusader image' of the, previously 'unreliable', Stephen III. For the time being, Venice avoided to promote him as a direct crusader challenge to Matthias. Still, the 'Walachian news' arrived, with Venice's consent, in Milan, in March 1474, were a first step in this direction. The republic's decision could have relied also on an aspect which Italian powers seemingly overlooked. At the time of his attack on Walachia, Stephen III had strong ties to Frederic III, who also tried to exploit the anti-Ottoman climate. The list of eastern Habsburg supporters (from Casimir IV and Martin Gostaldo, captain of Knin, to Feofil, archbishop of Novgorod, and Mengli Ghiray of the Golden Horde) on which Stephen III was placed, in early November 1473, by the Vienna chancery was rather eloquent. Stephen had to make sure, like the others, that Lodovico Severi, Latin Patriarch of Antioch, completed his crusader tour of East-Central Europe and arrived at Uzun Hassan's court without meeting with Matthias. By that time, Stephen III had completed his victorious, for the time being, Walachian campaign. He seemed a pillar for the Habsburg scheme, which failed in the end. The Latin Patriarch of Antioch, highly commended by Sixtus IV, due to his eastern crusader mission, eventually arrived in Buda, contrary to Frederic hopes. Matthias aided Severi who continued his journey to *Persia*, over Moldavia, as Matthias was also at war with Casimir. Whether as Frederic III's *captain* or as Matthias 'vassal', Stephen III stood on the main crusader road<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> E.g. HHStA, S.A., A.D.S., *Hungarica*, A.A., I-2, fasc. 2-4, f. 30<sup>r-v</sup> [1474]; *Libri*, V, no. XVI-65, p. 213; AMMANNATI PICCOLOMINI (Iacopo), *Lettere (1444-1479)*, edited by CHERUBINI (Paolo), III, Rome, 1997, no. 569, p. 1577; no. 755, p. 1875; no. 767, p. 1891; *Nachträge*, no. 280, p. 298; *Frammenti*, pp. 16-18; *Decreta Regni Hungariae. Gesetze und Verordnungen Ungarns*, edited by DÖRY (Ferenc), BÓNIS (György), ERSZEGI (Géza), TEKE (Zsuzsa), BÁCSKAI (Vera), [III], Budapest, 1989, 1474, art. 8, p. 215; *Chronicon Dubnicense cum codicibus Sambu ci Acephalo et Vaticano, cronicque Vindobonensi Picto et Budensi accurate collatum* (=Historiae Hungariae Fontes Domestici, III), edited by FLORIÁN (M[átyás]), Pécs, 1884, pp. 199-201; *Kemal Paşa Zade*, in *Cronici turceşti*, I, pp. 306-307. *Historia*, pp. 59-60; *Malipiero*, pp. 41, 43, 80, 171; SIMON, *Con-siderații*, pp. 12-14; IDEM, *Ştefan cel Mare şi Matia Corvin*, p. 111; MUREŞAN, *Girolamo Lando*, pp. 180-182.

<sup>32</sup> HHStA, Hs.S., Hs. W. 529, f. 261<sup>r</sup> (6<sup>th</sup> of November 1473; edited in *Regesten Friedrich*, suppl. II-1, no. 3539, p. 523); Masarykovy Universitni knihovny [The Library of the "Masaryk" University], Brno. Mk 9, *mikulovsky rukopis* [The Mikulov Manuscript], ff. 210<sup>r</sup>-283<sup>r</sup> (copy: MOL, Filmtár [Microfilm Archiv], *Nehring Karl gűjtése* [The Donation/ Legacy of Karl Nehring], rols. 30173-30174), ff. 228<sup>r</sup>-229<sup>r</sup> [Early 1474; abstract, under 1479, in NEHRING (Karl), *Quellen zur ungarischen Außenpolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahr-hunderts* (I), in *Levėltári Közlemények* [Archival Selections] (Budapest) XLVII (1976), 1 no. 91, p. 101); LJUBIĆ (Simeon), *Dispacci di Luca de Tollentis vescovo di Sebenico e di Lionello Cheregato vescovo di Traù nunzi apostolici in Borgogna e nelle Fiandre 1472-1488*, Zagreb 1876, no. I-13, p. 46; PIENARU (Naghi), *Pro-iectul scitic. Relațiile lui Ştefan cel Mare cu Hoarda Mare* [The Scythian Project: Stephen the Great's Relations to the Great Horde], in *Revista Istorică* [Historical Review] (Bucharest), NS, XXIV (2003), 5-6, p. 122.

Another aspect which influenced anti-Ottoman warfare on the Lower Danube and which was only (apparently) seldom taken into account by 'Italian analysts' was the situation of Transylvania. Venice's attitude towards Transylvania is hard to rate, though the coordination between her anti-Ottoman pillars of Buda and Suceava depended on it. Due to her representatives' in Hungary and Moldavia almost desperate reactions during Mehmed II's Moldavian campaign of 1476, it is possible that the republic did not (fully) realize the problem. This incapacity is quite intriguing given only the fact that the Transylvanian rebellion and Matthias' subsequent Moldavian failure of 1467 ensured the *salvation of the republic*, in the words of her officials. Though the political distances shortened and continental connections had become more frequent also for smaller states, connecting the different areas of interest was still a problem. This eventually led to the fact that in 1476 Mehmed II managed to escape from Moldavia, in spite of the planned Moldavian-Hungarian-Venetian-Tartar trap. Długosz went even as far as to blame Casimir IV, for he had not intervened and thus missed out on eternal glory. However, Transylvania, as well as the Volga (the Great Horde) and Crimean (the Golden Horde) Tartars were just some of the 'crusader' symptoms of anti-Ottoman efforts in the 1470<sup>33</sup>.

Given the context, even the reserved attitude in practice, enthusiastic in writing, of the Transylvanian nobility or of the citizens of the Saxon cities towards the anti-Ottoman actions of the 1470', towards the actions of their king or those of neighbor Stephen III, could be viewed as quite justified. A fact must be recalled. In 1476 and 1484, Matthias had to bring troops from Hungary proper in order to aid Stephen. This worked quite well in 1476, however, with a significant delay that increased Venice's worst fears, for, during Mehmed's attack, little seemed to be done in Transylvania, in spite of talks and rumors. Eight years later, in 1484, this proved to be a complete disaster. In mid 1484, in spite of Stephen Báthory's, acting voivode of Transylvania, and Matthias' pressures, apparently nobody in Transylvania and few in the Banate took action in favor of Stephen. A likely explanation might also be that Matthias, though he tried, at times (1469-1470 or 1476), to gather troops, via the traditional congregational channels, never called in the powerful Transylvanian assembly of estates, after the rebellion of 1467. After his death, the estates reconvened in 1493, the year of the great Ottoman attack on the voivodate. The attitude had its place in a wider *Christian* context. The military and tax policies generally associated with crusader style actions, the non-Ottoman rivalries and interests

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<sup>33</sup> For instance: MOL, DL 39311 (9<sup>th</sup> of July 1476); *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* (= *Monumenta Medii aevi res gestas Poloniae illustrantia*, II, XI-XII, XIV), Krakow 1876-1894; 4 volumes; III, edited by LEWICKI (Anatol), no. 222, p. 243; no. 258, p. 281; MHS, I-1, no. 1, p. 303; MDE, II, no. 46, p. 76; no. 223, p. 324; *Frammenti*, pp. 38-39; *Ammanati Piccolomini*, III, no. 871, p. 2059; *Politische Korrespondenz*, II, 1480-1490, 1894, no. 324h, p. 7, *Actae*, no. 19-23, p. 22-26; *Unrest* (1957), p. 68; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 646-647; *Anonimo Veronese*, p. 319; *Aşık Paşa Zade* (1966), p. 97; *Mehmed Neşri* (1966), p. 129; *Kemal Paşa Zade* (1966), p. 214; *Tursun Bey* (2007), p. 239; SIMON, *Ştefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 360-361.

fa-vored namely a reserved attitude towards anti-Ottoman endeavors. The attitude is quite eloquent if we take into account that, unlike the Italian or German powers and cities, Transylvania was not far away from the 'Ottoman front', from which she was separated only by Walachia. Matthias attempted to reform the realm's southern defense system, mainly after 1479. The re-form focused on the establishment of three major defense units (Slavonia, the Banate, Transylvania), but was jeopardized from the start in its eastern part. Here, regional security was better served by diplomatic means and arrangements, than by military acts and measures<sup>34</sup>.

### III. Diplomacy, Plans and Propaganda

Since late 1472, Mehmed II knew that Matthias, Uzun Hassan and Venice had reached a formal and mutual agreement to strike together the Ottoman Empire in due time. This was what the intercepted letters of Uzun Hassan to Matthias read. Mehmed also knew how hard it would be for such an attack to come together. He knew of the Venetian-Hungarian rivalry, but he had also experienced the recent military successes of the Venetian-Roman fleet and of Uzun Hassan's army. Therefore, he had to buy time and out of the 'three allies' Matthias was the easiest to talk with. After Sixtus IV started favoring a balanced solution in Bohemian matters and not one clearly in Matthias' favor, as initially, the king favorably responded to the sultan's friendly message, causing the pope's distress (May-June 1473). Meanwhile, in spite of the mutual agreement they had seemingly reached in late April, Casimir IV sent an offer to Frederic III. They had to attack Matthias from three sides, Casimir from the north, Frederic from the west and

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<sup>34</sup> ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Napoli*, cart. 244, fasc. 2, nn (9<sup>th</sup> of July 1484); *Ungheria*, cart. 645, fasc. 7, nn (19<sup>th</sup> of August 1476); Státný Oblastný Archiv Levoča [Regional State Archive of Levoča], Levoča (Lewocza, Leutschau, Lócse), [Section] L. Rody i panstvá [Families and Domains], I. Rody [Families], An-dráši (z Krásnej Hôrky) Archív/ Andrásy család levéltára [Archive of the Andrassy Family], [Section]: *Mohács előtti oklevelek* [Documents prior to Mohács], 17-59 (16<sup>th</sup> of September 1484: MOL, DF 265307); *Hurmuzaki*, II-2, no. 126, p. 146; no. XV-1, no. 124, p. 71; no. 137, p. 79; *Ub.*, VI, no. 3330, p. 152; VII, edited by GÜNDEISCH (Konrad), Bucharest, 1991, no. 4559, p. 357; *Actae*, nos. 18-20, pp. 20-23; *Frammenti*, p. 38; *Bonfini* (1936-1941), IV, p. 96; SIMON, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 235, 360-361. For the Hungarian (-Transylvanian) context; MOL, DL 27714 (21<sup>st</sup> of October 1479); NICOLAESCU (Stoica), *Documente slavo-române cu privire la relațiile Țării Românești și Moldovei cu Ardealul în secolele XV și XVI. Privilegiu comerciale, scrisori domnești și particulare din arhivele Sibului, Brașovului și Bistriței din Transilvania* [Slavo-Romanian Documents regarding the Moldavia's and Walachia's Relations to Transylvania in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Commercial Privileges. Princely Charters and Private Documents from the Archives of Sibiu (Hermannstadt, Szeben), Brașov (Kronstadt, Brassó) and Bistrița (Bistritz, Besztrece)] (Bucharest 1905, no. 55, pp. 136-137; no. 57, p. 140; *Ub.*, VII, no. 4670, p. 459; *Hurmuzaki*, XV-1; no. 99, p. 58; no. 171, p. 97; DRĂGAN (Ioan), *Nobilimea românească din Transilvania. 1440-1514* [The Romanian Nobility of Transylvania. 1440-1514], Bucharest, 2000, pp. 93-98, 235-244, 326; SZAKÁLY, *Phases*, pp. 93-94.

Stephen of Moldavia from the East. Knowing of Casimir's Hungarian and Moldavian failure of 1473 and having already his own (apparently and paradoxically more solid) contacts to Stephen, Frederic politely rejected the offer. He wanted to wait how the talks between Matthias and Mehmed, as well as the conflict between Mehmed and Uzun Hassan would end, and he also wanted to see how the Italian affairs of pope Sixtus IV evolved<sup>35</sup>.

The failure of his Habsburg-Jagiellonian plan, as well as Stephen's Walachian attack of late 1473, made Casimir IV reconsider, at least partially (in respect to the Hungarian-Polish conflict over suzerainty over Moldavia), his position towards Matthias. By the treaties of Stara Wiess in February 1474, some two weeks after the Ottoman raid on Oradea when news and anger on it had spread, but not enough to change Casimir's stand, Moldavia was placed virtually outside feudal relations for two years (that is it was granted truces/ *treguae*, almost literary breaks from both kingdoms), until a joint Polish-Hungarian committee convened and decided the faith of Moldavia. The arrangement allowed in fact Stephen to enter any form of alliance with Matthias without Poland having any grounds to contest it as long as Stephen did not swear allegiance to Matthias. The way for joint anti-Ottoman actions north of the Lower Danube seemed open, which came in favor of all parties involved in it, as Venice now could use more easily his promises and finances in Buda and in Suceava too. Still, as a month prior to the conclusion of the Stara Wiess arrangements, Casimir had not given up the hope of using Stephen III against Matthias, provided that the Polish king could mediate a truce between Moldavia and Walachia (in fact a rapprochement between Stephen and Mehmed II). But at that time, like months earlier (for instance, a month after the Ottoman raid on Oradea, Stephen struck again the sultan's positions in Walachia), Stephen followed Matthias' path<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> THEINER (Augustinus), *Vetera monumenta Hungariae sacram illustrantia*, II, Rome, 1861, no. 615, p. 434; *Guerre*, no. 55, p. 72; *Raguza*, no. 385, p. 631; *Notes*, IV, no. 295, p. 364; *Annunati Piccolomini*, III, no. 755, p. 1875; no. 767, p. 1891; *Frammenti*, pp. 16-19; MDE, II, no. 170, pp. 241-242; EMC, no. 69, pp. 89-93; *Codex*, III, no. 152, p. 175; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 584-588, 593-597, 602-604; *Malipiero*, p. 106; for East-West crusader contacts: MINORSKY (Vladimir), *La Perse au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle entre la Turquie et Venise* (=Publications de la Société des études iraniennes" VII (1933), 6-7), reprint in *Idem, The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages*, London, 1978, no. XII; EVANGELISTI (Pietro), *Politica e credibilità personale. Un diplomatico francescano tra Tabriz e la Borgogna (1450ca.-1479)*, in *Quaderni Storici* (Rome), XL (2005), 1, pp. 3-40; see in this respect also *Malipiero*, pp. 98, 108-110; *Anonimo Veronese*, pp. 306-307; *Vite 1474-1494*, pp. 22-29.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. 1, nn (31<sup>st</sup> of January, 14<sup>th</sup> of March, [May], 8<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup> of August 1474); MDE, II, no. 179, p. 259; no. 183, p. 263; *Codex*, III, nos.160-161, pp. 185-186; EMC, no. 72, p. 96; *Actae*, no. 7, p. 7. For the Roman context: FARENGA (Pietro), *Monumenta memoriae. Pietro Riario fra mito e storia*, in *Un pontificato ed una città: Sisto IV (1471-1484). Atti del Convegno Roma, 3-7 dicembre 1984*, edited by MIGLIO (Massimo), NIUTTA (Francesca), QUAGLIONI (Diego), RANIERI (Conetta), Vatican City, 1986, pp. 179-216; more recently: STROBL (Wolfgang), *Der Papstneffe Pietro Riario al Antichrist: Zeitkritisches in einem apokalyptischen Epos des 15. Jahrhunderts*, in

## 1. Roman Missions and Venetian Attempts

In March 1471, George (Jiri) Podiebrad died. The conflict between Matthias Corvinus and the Jagiellonians entered a new stage. The Vitéz conspiracy was growing and the Polish attack on Buda became imminent (July-August). At that time however, the Venetian pope Paul II died. A Genoese Franciscan, cardinal Francesco della Rovere, became pope as Sixtus IV. He immediately set out to revive the crusade. It was not only a matter of political calculations, but also a question of personal belief as the frequent, almost private, anti-Ottoman calls of the pope seem to attest. After the Vitéz conspiracy failed and the Polish campaign in Hungary turned out to be a disaster, in late December 1471, Sixtus IV appointed five anti-Ottoman legates de latere. The Venetian cardinal Marco Barbo had the toughest mission. He had to bring the crusade to *Germania, Hungaria et Polonia* and reconcile Frederic III, Matthias Corvinus and Casimir IV. The stakes of the mission were huge (a previous mediation attempted by the pope in November had failed) and so were the tasks of the new pope. The conclave which had elected Sixtus IV had made all cardinals swear, prior to the elections, that whoever was to become pope would continue anti-Ottoman warfare until victory and would use the much used and abused papal revenues of the alum Tolfa mines only to that end. The determination which can be deduced from such words, past the natural limits of speeches and interests at the curia or throughout Europe, was not weakened when Ottoman envoys reached Rome in November 1471 and presented pope Sixtus IV with sultan Mehmed II's peace offers and military threats<sup>37</sup>.

Sixtus IV was in close ties, closer even than those between Pius II and Francesco Sforza, with Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Lorenzo de Medici. Still, by mid 1474 he was in conflict with both of them (though he had made the Medici the bankers of the Holy See) due to 'Italian anti-Ottoman' reasons, and had to rely on Ferdinand of Aragon, formerly not his greatest supporter. Before events grew more complicated and official Rome

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*Archivium Historiae Pontificiae*, XLI (2003), pp. 73-81; SIMON, *Considerazioni*, pp. 3-11; IDEM, *Anti-Ottoman Warfare*, pp. 29-31.

<sup>37</sup> ASV, Arm. XXI-52, ff. 75<sup>r</sup>-76<sup>r</sup>, 77<sup>r</sup> (10<sup>th</sup> of August, 22<sup>nd</sup> of December); XXXI-62, ff. 14<sup>v</sup>-16<sup>v</sup> (31<sup>st</sup> of December 1471); *Hurmuzaki*, II-2, no. 188, pp. 203-205; MANNUCCI (Ubaldo), *Le capitolazioni del conclave di Sisto IV (1471)*, in *Römische Quartalschrift* (Rome), XXIX (1915), pp. 73-90; Malipiero, pp. 69-80; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, p. 315 (note 5); it is probably noteworthy that Bessarion, the first among the cardinals, was sent not to the East, but to the West, namely to France (in this respect, see also MESERVE (Margaret), *Patronage and Propaganda at the First Paris Press: Guillaume Fichet and the First Edition of Bessarion's Oration against the Turks*, in *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* (New York), XCVII (2003), pp. 521-588). Given also Bessarion's Vienna mission of 1460, his 'men in Hungary' (e.g. Antonio Rigo, *Bessarione, Giovanni Regiomontano e i loro studi su Tolomeo a Venezia e Roma (1462-1464)*, in *Studi Veneziani* (Venice), XXI (1991), pp. 49-110), and the Hungarian events earlier that same year 1471, this choice of destinations could prove relevant for further analysis on crusading in the early and mid 1470'.

gestures of reconciliation were needed in order to restore the resemblance of a functional anti-Ottoman alliance with Venice, the republic and the papacy had shared the costs and the fruits of the fleet sent to the East, in which only the pope had invested up to 150.000 ducats. The fleet led by future doge Pietro Mocenigo and cardinal Oliviero Carafa had a few initial successes but failed to achieve its goals (enter the Dardanelles, render genuine aid to Uzun Hassan and/ or establish a bridge-head in Asia Minor), because of the burnings and killings of the Venetians, eager to take vengeance for the fall of Negroponte, which brought crusader action to a halt (August-September 1472). A year later, Uzun Hassan suffered his terrible defeat and Mehmed II re-turned victorious from what had begun as a disastrous campaign. Uzun wanted revenge and his calls for a counterstrike were sustained also by the rather astonishing fact that, following his severe defeat, Mehmed's rival had suffered no major territorial losses. In front of such a reaction, there was however the obstacle posed by the situation in East-Central Europe<sup>38</sup>.

Unlike other cardinals, Marco Barbo tried everything to accomplish his mission and only returned to the peninsula in late 1474. In early March 1472, Sixtus IV acknowledged Matthias as king of Bohemia and granted to Barbo the power to excommunicate the Jagiellonians and to free the Teuton Knights and the Bohemians from their oaths of loyalty to Casimir IV and respectively to Wladislaw. In fact by excommunicating the Jagiellonians, the papal bulla freed all their vassals from their allegiance. This applied also for Stephen. But as the Jagiellonians revised their stands and showed willingness to negotiate, through Barbo, with Matthias, Sixtus IV left these questions to be decided by the rival kings, as he personally favored a matrimonial solution to the regional crisis. This solution should have brought Moldavia as dowry under Matthias' suzerainty and thus almost the entire Ottoman frontline from the Adriatic to the Black Sea under his control. The anti-Ottoman successes in the East boosted the pope's confidence and his willingness to conclude the Hunyadi-Jagiellonian conflict (June-September 1472). Following almost four months of continuous negotiations, in late April 1473, an arrangement was reached between Matthias and Casimir IV, but only for the old Polish-Hungarian disputes. The conflicts soon re-irrupted and seemed not to have an end in the near

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<sup>38</sup> ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Venezia*, cart. 358, fasc. 3, nn (13<sup>th</sup> of March); fasc. 7, nn (12<sup>th</sup> of July 1472), fasc 13, nn (11<sup>th</sup> of January); fasc. 19, nn (17<sup>th</sup> of July 1473); cart. 359, fasc. 2, nn (16<sup>th</sup> of February 1474); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 25, cc. 161v-162r (27<sup>th</sup> of October 1472); *Magno*, f. 576v [May, October-November 1473]; *Libri*, V, no. XVI-65, pp. 212-213; *Malipiero*, pp. 71-74, 83-86; *Navagero*, cols. 1131-1137; BERCHET, *La Repubblica di Venezia*, pp. 137-139; DE ROOVER (Raymond), *The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank. 1397-1494*, Cambridge, Mass, 1963, pp. 152-164; SCHREINER (Peter), *Eine zweite Handschrift des Ordo Portae und der Wegbeschreibung in das Gebiet des Uzun Hasan. Mit einer Hypothese zur Verfasserfrage*, in *Südost-Forschungen*, XLI (1982), pp. 9-25; see CUSIN (Fabio), *Il confine orientale d'Italia nella politica europea del XIV e XV secolo*, II, Milan, 1937, pp. 177-178, 186-187, 199-201, 216-217, 235-238.

future. However, as al-ways one could add, a formal truce came which created the impression of potential calm<sup>39</sup>.

After February 1474, namely in the summer of the same year, using the occasion provided by the messengers of Uzun Hassan who traveled their courts, Matthias and Casimir exchanged promises of immediate major anti-Ottoman action, while, behind the stages, they tried to undermine each others positions. The crusader situation was further aggravated by the fact that after controlling his nepotism for more than a year, since early 1473, pope Sixtus IV had pushed the peninsula, which need only a little memento to return to conflict, into political turmoil following the political and matrimonial profits he had tried to collect from his relation to Milan, which then even turned against him in fact. Sixtus IV' Italian actions of 1473 were to have a direct and, needless to say, negative impact on the future course of crusading in 1475 and 1476, in particular. The old conflicts between Rome and Venice were only formally contained, while, following his matrimonial arrangement, mediated by Rome, in Naples, the traditional disputes, concerning financing and the Dalmatian coastline, between Venice and Buda were reinitiated, complicated also by the republic's policy of promoting Stephen III as the new model crusader. As in East-Central Europe, the years of crusader planning and primary actions (1471/1472-1474), in the peninsula too, bore, to the political strives they had tried to end and predominantly managed only to further, the seeds of future anti-Ottoman failures<sup>40</sup>.

## 2. Eastern Plans, Promises and Priorities

In spring 1475, prior to the fall of Caffa, a Venetian anti-Ottoman project was presented in Rome. Matthias should have attacked Mehmed II in Serbia and Bosnia. Stephen III, *voivode of Serbia and Moldavia*, together with Casimir, who, menaced by the

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<sup>39</sup> ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Venezia*, cart. 358, fasc. 2 (14<sup>th</sup> of February 1472); cart. 359, fasc. 4, nn (4<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> of April); fasc. 5, nn (13<sup>th</sup> of May); cart. 360, fasc. 1, nn (5<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> of July); fasc. 2, nn (5<sup>th</sup> of August 1474). *Codex*, III, nos. 152-153, pp. 175-176; *Peter Eschenloer's Stadschreibers zu Breslau Geschichten der Stadt Breslau, oder Denkwürdigkeiten seiner Zeit vom Jahre 1440 bis 1479*, edited by KUNISH (Johann-Gottlieb), II, Breslau, 1828, pp. 55, 69-74, 84-91; WEBER (Benjamin), *La croisade impossible. Étude sur les relations entre Sixt IV et Mathias Coroin (1471-1484)*, in *Hommage à Alain Ducellier. Byzance et ses périphéries (monde grec, balkanique et musulman)*, edited by DOUMERC (Bernard), PICARD (Christophe), Toulouse, 2004, pp. 316-317; see also NEHRING (Karl), *Herrschaftstradition und Herrschaftslegitimität. Zur ungarischen Aussenpolitik in der Zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XIII (1974), 3, pp. 463-472.

<sup>40</sup> MDE, II, nos. 171-172, pp. 245-248; no. 173, p. 249; no. 179, p. 259; no. 183, p. 263; IV, Appendix, no. 10, p. 304; *Nachträge*, no. 190, p. 202; no. 234, p. 257; no. 251, p. 266; no. 255, p. 273; no. 280, p. 298; DĄBROWSKA (Mágorzata), *Uzun Hassan's Project of Alliance with the Polish King (1474)*, in *Mélanges d'histoire Byzantine offerts à Oktawiusz Jurewicz à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire (= Byzantina Lodziensia, III)* [edited by CERAN (Waldemar)], Łódź, 1998, pp. 171-185; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, p. 324; SIMON, *The Limits of the Moldavian Crusade*, pp. 204-206; WEBER, *La croisade*, p. 318.

Hungarian-Moldavian 'en-tente', sought a *Turkish deal*, was supposed to attack in Bulgaria. Realistic in terms of the military forces involved, the project was quite unrealistic on the actual military and political level. The authorities of Stephen of Moldavia and Matthias Corvinus, though the first one was technically under the 'patronage' of the second one, were mixed up, while there was no real coordination planned between them. The Transylvanian link between the Hungarian core of Matthias' power and Moldavia, the king's (and Venice's and Rome's) anti-Ottoman instrument, was thus not even mentioned. The project's value is of diplomatic nature, due also to the disputes for crusader subsidies arisen after Vaslui. Especially Venice made several promises to Stephen III. *Bulgaria* was probably promised too to him as she had been to Hunyadi in 1444. According to Moldavian records from the 1700', the promises were even greater, covering most of the lands between the Lower Danube and Istanbul. As the East seemed to shelter the last anti-Ottoman resources available to Venice, such promises may have been actually made<sup>41</sup>.

Another factor whose importance Matthias, following the footsteps of his father, had been quick to realize (since the latest his first Bosnian campaign of 1463), were the potential and real Muslim rivals of the Ottomans on the northern and southern banks of the Black Sea. In particular, the Tartars seemed within the reach of the king's diplomacy with predictable actual anti-Ottoman actions with immediate impact on the position of the Hungarian kingdom. In the 1470', such an approach was relevant also because Venice was trying to push the Tartars, divided between the Golden (predominantly pro-Ottoman) and the Great Horde, into conflict with Mehmed II. Venice's Tartar schemes eventually came to Stephen's advantage. In 1471, Stephen had crushed Mengli Ghiray's Tartars. Six years earlier, Mengli's father, Hadji, had promised to the papal legate in the area that he would personally make sure that the sultan would not harm Hungary or Moldavia, after Stephen had conquered Chilia, from where the Hungarian garrison had recently been expelled. Stephen's Tartar victory had a great impact on Vienna. The Habsburg report of 1474 on Stephen began with his victory over the *Tartar emperor*, which was chronologically mingled with his victory over Matthias (1467). Still, even

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<sup>41</sup> For instance: ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn [A-pril-May 1475; edited, under 1462, in RADONIĆ (Jovan), *Durađ Kastriot Skenderbeg i Arbanija XV veku (isto-riska iratha)* [George Castriot Skanderbeg and Albania in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century (Historical Sources)] (= *Spomenik* [Cenotaph], XCV), Belgrade, 1942, no. 226, pp. 128-129, mistaken dating; for instance, Paolo Mauroceno, the Venetian representative in Rome, by which this plan was made public, was active in Rome in the mid 1470'; *Codex*, III, no. 202, p. 223; no. 222, p. 243; no. 226, p. 246; EMC, nos. 80-81, pp. 103-108; *Veneția*, no. 20, p. 260; CAZACU (Matei), *Un voyageur dans les pays roumains et son Histoire de la Moldavie: Leyon Pierce Balthasar von Campenhausen (1746-1808)*, in *Național și universal în istoria românilor. Studii oferite prof. dr. Șerban Papacostea cu ocazia împlinirii a 70 de ani* [National and Universal in the History of the Romanians. *Festschrift* for Șerban Papacostea on his 70<sup>th</sup> Birthday], edited by CRISTEA (Ovidiu) and LAZĂR (Gheorghe), Bucharest, 1998, p. 414; see SIMON, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 379-380, 491-495.

after Stephen's challenges to the Ottoman supremacy in the Black Sea area intensified, Venice took into account the possibility of overrunning Moldavia with Tartars and Russians if it he did not take any further anti-Ottoman actions (1472-1473). In 1476-1477, the Volga Tartars came to Moldavia's border. Venice asked Stephen to take the Tartars and conquer Bulgaria. Stephen III politely refused. He did not want his state to stand for an oriental passage way<sup>42</sup>.

The longer Matthias re-entered anti-Ottoman affairs the more he became co-dependent on Stephen III of Moldavia in terms of direct action, as well as of diplomatic talks and impact. This had already been made clear throughout the previous decade. In 1462, Stephen III's, though failed, attack on Chilia, had drastically diminished the anti-Ottoman chances of success as Mehmed II ravaged Walachia. Just a month later, Matthias was therefore more than pleased to announce that Stephen had changed his mind and was willing to support him in Hungarian-Habsburg affairs too. Throughout 1463-1464, during Matthias' Bosnian campaigns, Stephen, officially still a loyal subject of the Porte, did not attack the king's Hungarian lands. In 1465, Stephen and Matthias basically worked together for recovering Chilia from under Ottoman-Walachian control. In 1466, even Venice had to acknowledge that the Moldavian *voievode* was one of Matthias' *recomandati* in the projected peace treaty with the Porte. In 1467, Stephen's 'last minute' desertion of the planned anti-Ottoman campaign brought Matthias' crusader career of the 1460' to an end and fueled the Transylvanian rebellion too. These were not aspects which Matthias liked to recall and still he had to depend on the changing Moldavian ruler, more than John Hunyadi had been compelled to deal or to work with George (Đurađ) Branković. Nevertheless, these were not the only 'Greek rite' necessities of the crusade<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> E.g. HHStA, S.A., A.D.S., *Hungarica*, A.A., I-2, fasc. 2-4, f. 30r; *Történelmi bizottságának oklevél-másolatai* [Safety Copies of Historical Documents], edited by ÓVÁRY (Lipót), I, *Mohácsi vész előtti okiratok kivonatai* [Documents prior to the Battle of Mohács], Budapest, 1890; nos. 550, 553, p. 141; *Guerre*, no. 85, pp. 106-107; no. 90, pp. 112-113; *Veneția*, no. 20, pp. 260-261; MOLLINET (Jean), *Chroniques*, editors DOUTREPONT (Georges), JODOGNE (Omer), II, 1488-1506, Brussels, 1935, p. 199; Malipiero, pp. 41, 43, 73-74; *Cronica moldo-germană*, pp. 32-33; PIENARU (Naghi), *Relațiile lui Ștefan cel Mare cu Hanatul din Crimeea. O controversă: prima incursiune tătară în Moldova* [Stephen the Great's Relations to Khanate of Crimea. A Controversy: The First Tartar Raid on Moldavia], in *Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt: Atlet al credinței creștine* [Stephen the Great and Holy: Athlete of the Christian Faith] [editors GOROVEI (Ștefan Sorin), SZÉKELY (Maria-Magdalena)], The Holy Monastery Putna, 2004, p. 298; SIMON, *The Arms of the Cross*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>43</sup> E.g. WAGNER (Carl), *Diplomatarium Comitatus Sarosiensis*, Bratislava-Cracow, 1780, no. III-20, p. 123, IVÁNYI (Béla), *Bártfa szabad királyi város levéltára 1319-1526* [The Archive of the Free Royal City of Bártfa (Bardejove)], I, Budapest, 1910, no. 1425, p. 217; MDE, II, nos. 11-12, pp. 20-24; no. 23, p. 41; no. 37, p. 64; no. 46, p. 75; IV, Appendix, no. 4, p. 290; MKL, I, no. 59, p. 78; no. 62, p. 83; no. 77, p. 110; *Ulb.*, VI, no. 3117, pp. 11-12; no. 3576, p. 314; PALL, *Rapporti*, no. 67, p. 208; no. 72, p. 213; no. 80, p. 219; *Regesten Friedrich*, XV, no. 196, p. 156; no. 212, p. 164, *Bonfini* (1936-1941), IV, pp. 8-10, 14-17; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 372, 377-380, 408-410, 530, 537-538, 545-546, 550; HOUSLEY (Norman), *The Later Crusades. From Lyons to*

Anti-Ottoman actions were equally matter of the Churches, of Church union in particular. This had been made clear in the case of Ivan III's marriage to Zoe and Russia's crusader planned crusader action (1472). Rome's and Venice's Muscovite hopes, born, in this case, by Bessarion's designs, quickly faded away. The matter became more pressing. Stephen of Moldavia was the only Greek rite politician left to their avail. They focused on him. Mehmed tried to respond to the plans also through the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as he had probably done already in 1467, with royal Polish support. Patriarch Simeon I basically accompanied, through *Bulgaria*, Suleiman Beg's army, sent against Stephen in late 1474. His repeated anti-Ottoman acts and Latin talks had resulted in a break with the Moldavian Orthodox hierarchs, namely with metropolite Theoctist I, the leader of the anti-unionist party. At the end of 1473, the hierarchs had left the princely council. They were never to return. After Matthias' had withdrawn his support a unionist hierarchy in Hungary, following the intensification of his Dalmatian conflict with Venice (1469-1470) and, probably, also the links between Bessarion and the humanist conspirators of 1471, and after Casimir IV Jagiello had made it clear that he had no intention of endorsing or tolerating an independent pro-Roman approach from the part of the Russian elite of Lithuania, Venice thought that the time had come that *Greek* Moldavia too should accept the authority of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople she controlled (1475-1476). Venice failed. As for Matthias, he was gradually changing his approach of the Greek matter within his realm or at its borders. The change was completed after Matthias' campaigns of 1480-1481<sup>44</sup>.

### 3. Crusader Plans for the Black Sea Area

As Stephen III of Moldavia's Hungarian relations improved and the Walachian conflict developed, on the eve of his Crimean marriage, the ruler, who overcame also a major domestic plot (1471-1472), intensified his pressures on Caffa. He basically tried to do the same John Hunyadi had done both prior and (namely) after the fall of Byzantium, that is push Caffa into war with the Ottomans, but with traditional Moldavian means and aims, which frequently re-called the resent caused by the

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*Alcazar, 1274-1580*. Oxford-New York, 1992, pp. 106-108; SIMON (Alexandru), *Antonio Bonfini's Valachorum regulus: Matthias Corvinus, Transylvania and Stephen the Great*, in *Between Worlds*, I, pp. 218-221.

<sup>44</sup> *Venetia*, no. 31, p. 273; no. 47, p. 290; no. 51, p. 203; *Actae*, no. 17, p. 18; [AMMA[N]NATI (Jacopo)], *Diarium Conistoriale dell cardinale Ammanati atribuito dal Muratori a Giacomo Gherardi da Volterra*, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* (Bologna-Città del Castello), XXIII (1904), 3, p. 143; [BURK[H]ARD (Johannes)] *Joannis Burkardi Liber Notarum ab anno MCCCCLXXXIII usque ad annum MDVI* (= *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XXXII, 1), editor CELANI (Enrico), I, Città di Castello, 1906, pp. 136-137; LAURENT (Vitalien), *Les premiers patriarches de Constantinople sous la domination turque (1454-1476)*, in *Revue des Études Byzantines* (Paris), XXVI (1968), pp. 267-268; ALEF (Gustave), *Diaspora Greeks in Moscow*, *Byzantine Studies* (Tempe; Arizona), VI (1979), p. 29; PLIGUZOV (Andrei). *On the Title 'Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus*, in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass), XV (1991), 3-4, p. 343; MUREȘAN, *Girolamo Lando*, p. 170.

ongoing disputes between Moldavia and the Genoese in the Black Sea area. The Ottoman tribute paying Genoese metropolis of Crimea, under Mengli Ghiray's protection in particular, was Stephen's main Christian rival in terms of north-pontic trade and tried also to gain, like Stephen, the favor of the Genoese born pope Sixtus IV (which she largely did in return for promising aid in the eventuality of a great crusade). As for Stephen, he tried to increase his control over the harbors in his possession, former Genoese colonies and still largely autonomous in relation to Suceava (1473-1474). He eventually could not rely on them. Prior to the battle of Vaslui, which allowed him to retake possession over these harbors, Chilia and Cetatea Albă, or the *harbors of the Hungarians*, as they were named by late Byzantine, Ottoman or Italian sources (namely in Hunyadi's days and after their final fall into Ottoman hands in 1484) had surrendered to the *Turk*. Stephen was not taken by surprise<sup>45</sup>.

Caffa still refused to engage in an anti-Ottoman alliance. Her answer did not change after Vaslui. However, also because Venice, Genoa's arch-rival, exploited Stephen's gain by concluding, in secret, a truce with the Porte, Caffa could not avoid Ottoman conquest in summer 1475. This was a hard blow for Stephen too, Matthias' anti-Ottoman (reluctant and stub-born if so) instrument who officially became the king's vassal a month later. Stephen III had more reasons for concern. Equally troubling was his control over his other apparent desired area of expansion. His Walachian political and military successes did usually not last longer than a month, whether he acted alone or, at least in theory, with Hungarian armed support. Frederic III's proposition made probably following the chancery report on Stephen III, of early 1474, that Stephen should be granted rule over Walachia, in return for his support of Habsburg action against Matthias was thus rather presumptuous. Vienna could not give what Buda failed to take for herself. Besides, in 1473-1474, the main focus of the crusade was, not only in case of the Walachians and the Tartars, seemingly in the Black Sea area, as also a certain Constantine Great Comenos, *filz du duc de Trapezonde*, was sent from Burgundian Dijon to Vienna. Moldavia remained, in Rome's, but also in Venice's perspective, a foremost pontic crusader force. In 1476, Sixtus IV asked Burgundy for help. The *Ungaris et Valacchis marique Helespontico* should not face

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<sup>45</sup> For instance: ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Roma*, cart. 79, fasc. 5, nn (14<sup>th</sup> of September 1475); *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 2, nn (20<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1476); VIGNA (Raimondo Amedeo), *Codice diplomatico delle colonie tauro-liguri durante la signoria dell'Ufficio di S. Giorgio. MCCCCLIII-MCCCCLXXV* (=Atti della Società ligure di storia patria, VI-VII) (Genoa 1868-1879); 2 toms/ 3 volumes; I, no. 120, pp. 307-309; no. 151, pp. 364-368; no. 377, p. 815; II-2, no. 658, p. 338; no. 1087, pp. 103-104; no. 1102, pp. 114-116; no. 1104, p. 122; no. 1117, p. 195; *Acte*, III, pp. 50, 88; PIPPIDI (Andrei), *Lettres inédites de Leonardo III Tocco*, in *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* (Bucharest), XXXII (1994), 1-2, pp. 69-70; PAPACOSTEA (Șerban), *Moldova lui Ștefan cel Mare și genevezii din Marea Neagră* [Stephen the Great's Moldavia and the Genoese of the Black Sea <Area>], in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol* [Yearbook of the A.D. Xenopol Institute of History] (Iași), XXIX (1992), pp. 70-72; see also SIMON, *The Use*, pp. 214-215.

the *Turk* alone. Yet, at that time, not even the Orthodox ties between Suceava and Moscow were fully functional. This too did not come as a real surprise<sup>46</sup>.

The Moldavian (-Hungarian) victory of Vaslui could be (and was) viewed as a great surprise. Few expected the Ottomans to be defeated and even fewer were willing to believe that. The different negotiations, rumors and expectations had prepared neither Poland or Hungary, nor the Italian Peninsula, for such an outcome. Fear immediately resurfaced. Sultan Mehmed II's vengeance was unavoidable. In the end, like on the eve of the fall of Caffa, it all came down to two things: the *Turk* should attack somewhere else and, if he did so, may God give him a defeat as the one suffered at Vaslui (or, as report sent, in late May 1475, to Venice and Milan from Ragusa put it: *che s'el andara, prego Dio la secunda cavalchata corresponda ala prima*). Finding a 'master-mind' behind these eastern events of the early 1470' (in particular of 1472/ 1473-1474) is thus not easy. Yet, It is useful, due to the peculiar Muslim and Greek contacts involved, as the relations between Buda, Rome and Venice were still tense, though this did not imply a break in anti-Ottoman talks. Matthias seemingly did not offer a traditional official greeting to Sixtus IV on his election (1471) until early 1475. After Bessarion's death (1472), a real coordination between Roman and Venetian *Greek* plans was seemingly reattempted, only at the beginning of 1474, when Girolamo Lando became Latin Patriarch of Constantinople<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> ASV, Misc., Arm., II-30, f. 44 (49)<sup>r</sup> (25<sup>th</sup> of February 1476; edited in ARTNER (Edgár), *Magyarország mit a Nyugati Keresztény művelődés védobástyjája: a Vatikánai Levéltárnak azo okiratai, melyek oseinknek a Keletrol Európát fenyegeto veszedelmek ellen kifejet erofeszítéseire vonatkoznak (cca. 1214-1606)* [Hungary as *Propugnaculum* of Western Christianity: Documents from the Vatican Secret Archives (ca. 1214-1606)], edited by KORNÉL (Szovág), Budapest, 2004, no. 101, pp. 111-112); HHStA, S.A., A.D.S., *Hungarica*, A.A., I-2, fasc. 2-4, f. 30<sup>r</sup>; *Relațiile istorice dintre popoarele URSS și România în veacurile XV-începutul celui de al XVIII-lea* [The Historic Relations between the People of the USSR and Romania in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century–Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century], I, Bucharest-Moscow, 1966, no. 9, pp. 61-62; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 609-612, 618-621, *Bonfini* (1936-1941), IV, p. 61; MICHELSON (Luise), *Michael Alighieri, Gesandter Kaiser Davids von Trapezunt, am Hof der Herzöge von Burgund (1461-1470)*, in *Archeion Pontou* (Athens), XLI (1987), pp. 190-192; PÁLFIY (Géza), *The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (up to the Early Eighteenth Century)*, in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, edited by DÁVID (Géza), FÖDOR (Pál), Leiden–Boston–Cologne, 2000, pp. 10-13, 18 (in particular); SIMON (Alexandru), *The Hungarian Means of the Relations between the Habsburgs and Moldavia at the End of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica*, VIII (2006), pp. 259-296 (with further archival data).

<sup>47</sup> E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn (14<sup>th</sup> of February 1475); *Turchia-Levante*, cart. 647, fasc. 1, nn (29<sup>th</sup> of May 1475); *Venezia*, cart. 361, fasc. 3, nn (28<sup>th</sup> of February, 5<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1475); THEINER (Augustinus), *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia*, II, Rome, 1861, no. 221, p. 179; *Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis*, editor LUKSICS (József), III, 1416-1492, Budapest 1902, no. 481, p. 329; *Hurmuzaki*, II-2, no. 202, p. 224; *Nachträge*, no. 167, p. 180; *Frammenti*, p. 27; *Anonimo Veronese*, p. 310; *Długosz* (1887), pp. 622-623, 638; FENEȘAN (Costin), *Jörg von Nürnberg-o restituire nesară pentru istoria luptelor lui Ștefan*

Such gaps and doubts led to the idea of a crusader blueprint attributed to Bessarion, which could have and should have (according to Venice's interests and plans) pope in 1455, 1464 or 1471, and who had major ties to Greek, Latin and Muslim politicians. Whether or not the events of 1473-1474 were the result of his design, an aspect is certain. His 'crusade' worked better than the one granted, as consolation prize to another unsuccessful papal candidate and Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, Thomas (Tamás) Bakócz, archbishop of Esztergom (Gran) and Venice's long-time favorite (1513). The 'crusade of 1514' severely harmed the weakened realm, while the 'crusade' of the early 1470' had quite the opposite effect on the kingdom of St. Stephen. The negotiations and plans of the early 1470' were, in essence, not too different from other projects and negotiations of the late 1400'. What made them 'special', for the moment, as well as, to a certain extent, over time, were the Danubian and Pontic combats of 1475-1476, in particular. These combats ended in an overall 'draw', by far the best anti-Ottoman result of the last decades. The 'draw' however costed the *Christians* more than it costed the High Porte. A *Realpolitiker*, though not a 'non-believer' in the common cause of the cross, Matthias realized that, for the time being, he had reached his crusader limits<sup>48</sup>.

## The Means and Options of a King

Due to practical, as well as to ideological reasons, the Hungarian southern border was, *par excellence*, alongside with the Iberian Peninsula, the border area of crusading Christendom. Because, over time, whether by direct presences or through vassal means,

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*cel Mare cu Imperiul Otoman (1475-1476)* [Jörg of Nuremberg: A Necessary Restitution for the History of Stephen the Great's Combats with the Ottoman Empire. 1475-1476], in *Revista Arhivelor* [The Archives Review] (Bucharest), LIX (1982), 3, pp. 285-288: see also FUBINI (Riccardo), *Diplomacy and Government in the Italian City-States of the Fifteenth Century (Florence and Venice)*, in *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450-1800*, edited by FRIGO (Daniela), Cambridge, 2000, pp. 25-48; IDEM, *Lega*, pp. 486-488; MUREȘAN, *Girolamo Lando*, pp. 173-174, 181-184.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. HOUSLEY (Norman), *Crusading as Social Revolt: The Hungarian Peasant Uprising of 1514*, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (Cambridge), XLIX (1998), 2, pp. 1-28; RONCHIN (Silvia), *Malatesta/ Paleologhi, un'alleanza dinastica per rifondare Bisanzio nel quindicesimo secolo*, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (Munich), XCIII (2000), 2, pp. 521-567; SIMON (Alexandru), *Lumea lui Djem. Suceava, Buda și Istanbul în anii 1480* [Djem's World. Suceava, Buda and Istanbul in the 1480'], in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu* [Year-book of the George Barițiu Institute of History] (Cluj-Napoca), XLVIII (2005), pp. 11-43; DAMIAN (Iulian Mihai), *La Depositeria del la Crociata (1463-1490) e i sussidi dei pontifici romani a Mattia Corvino*, in *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica* (Venise), VIII (2006), pp. 144-145. On Bessarion, dean of the Sacred College of Cardinals (1463-1471), and thus in charge of the 1464 and 1471 conclaves, and his environment: MOHLER (Ludwig), *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann*, I-III, Paderborn, 1923-1942, HARRIS, Jonathan, *Greek Emigres in the West*, Camberley, 1995, MONFASANI (John), *Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and other Émigrés*, Aldershot, 1995 (studies).

this realm's border touched the Adriatic and Black Sea areas, the matter stretched beyond the importance of the direct military terrestrial contact with the Porte. Following the Anjous, the Hunyadis, exploited this state of facts. As Genoa and Venice, the main powers in terms of eastern sea domination, lost ground in front of the *Turk*, for which the received Ottoman deals could not compensate for, Hungary's stand increasingly influenced maritime affairs. As in the mid 1300', early 1400', this came much to the dislike of the Italian powers. They thus tried to take matters as much as they could in their own hands, for the price requested by the Hungarian crown for its benevolence was rather great too. The fragile position of the papacy, from Calixtus III to Sixtus IV, suited politicians and not the crusade. It is remarkable that a deal like the one between Bayezid II and Innocent VIII (1490) was not sealed sooner. In return, the Roman-Muslim anti-Ottoman arrangements had significantly multiplied. Greater attention, fueled by the various deals and conflicts triggered by the union of Florence, was given to the *Greek rite* Christians, prior and after 1453. More than before the two major parts, Latin and Muslim, involved in the clash could not rely only their 'pure' political and military reservoirs. They had to turn, not without risks, to such Christians, namely in the cases of apparently neutral areas, such as the Polish-Lithuanian union. At the same time, several 'Turkish solutions' to the Ottoman problem were also looked for<sup>49</sup>.

Bayezid Osman (*Calixtus Ottomanus/ il Turchetto*), Murad II's alleged son, arrived in Rome in 1455. In 1456, Hunyadi requested him, but it was his son who received him (1465), after Pius II' death. *Il Turchetto* was no Djem and his career was short-lived. After the Hungarian troubles of 1467, the outbreak of the Bohemian wars (1468) and the fall of Negroponte (1470), solving the Ottoman problem by a *Turk* (too), even baptized, by a refugee, was not viewed as an option in the early 1470'. The classic 'Turkish solution' thus changed shape. It was focused on fueling *Turkish* domestic strives and aiding the Muslim rivals of the Porte. The Empire had to fail from within, while receiving foreign blows from Christian, as well as Muslim powers. It was difficult to find a *Turkish* match for Mehmed. In the 1480', Mamluk Egypt, discontent Ottoman politicians and Djem provided the grounds for a full-scale attack on 'weakling' Bayezid II. The anti-Ottoman failures in the second half of 1470' made the foreign, classic, 'Turkish solution' once again of interest. Djem's arrival on Rhodes and Bayezid II's apparent and real weaknesses (1482-1483) brought this solution to unparalleled levels of political use. Even if, regardless of their actual legitimacy, all

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<sup>49</sup> For an overview, see HOFMANN (Georg), *Pius II. und die Kircheneinheit des Ostens*, in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (Rome), XII (1946), 2, pp. 217-247; PFEFFERMANN (Hans), *Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Türken*, Winterthur, 1946, pp. 9-14; HESS (Andrew C.), *The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century Ibero-African Frontier*, Chicago, 1978; WERNER (Ernst), *Translatio Imperii ad Turcos: päpstliche Renovatio und Weltkaiseridee nach dem Fall Constantinopels*, in *Byzantinische Forschungen* (Amsterdam), XI (1987), pp. 465-472; VON STROMER (Wolfgang), *Landmacht gegen Seemacht. Kaiser Sigismunds Kontinentalsperre gegen Venedig 1412-1433*, in *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* (Berlin), XXII (1995), pp. 145-189; BLANCHET (Marie-Hélène), *La question de l'union des églises (13<sup>e</sup>-15<sup>e</sup> siècle). Historiographie et perspectives*, in *Revue des Études Byzantines*, LXI (2003), pp. 5-48 (in particular).

contenders were expected to rule over a rather small state, in case the plan worked, the 'Turkish solution' marked that real victory over the *Turk* had grown from a matter of glory into a question of necessity. The growth signified that Christian border rulers, basically regardless of rank or future rewards, were viewed by the main powers of the crusade strictly as pawns in view of the ultimate goal. They had to put a plan into practice that was not theirs. They were aware of their 'Italian status'. These 'pawns' tried to make the most out of it, even to directly challenge it<sup>50</sup>.

The fragile Italian balance power further motivated the eastern political actions and stands. The balance in question was terribly upset by Sixtus IV's domestic policy of namely 1473-1474. Previously, in spite of all inner difficulties and disputes, a north-south axis (Milan-Florence-Naples) had functioned, creating a counterbalance, usually not to the Italian profit of the crusade, to Roman and Venetian games and ambitions. After 1474, Rome had to draw close to Naples and vice-versa, while Venice entered an entente with Milan and Florence. As, for instance, Naples, Matthias' future difficult ally, was no match for Venice on Roman crusader soil, the result was that anti-Ottoman warfare was pushed to its survival limit, a fact which the Porte cleverly exploited. 1484, the year which marked, in spite of the plans drawn up in Buda and Rome in 1489-1490, the official end of Matthias' crusader career, is maybe one of the best examples for the paradox vulnerabilities, which were a result of and a proof for the growing interdependence between the Porte and Christendom's Italian and East-Central European borderlands. In 1484, as well as throughout his reign, Bayezid II avoided to directly attack, but not to challenge by raids, the Western Christian powers and stroke the Christian territories closer to his center of power. In a way, he had reacted like his father. In 1473-1474, Mehmed too seemed vulnerable. Though he had defeated Uzun Hassan, the latter still called for vengeance. He was encouraged to do so by the Christian powers. Moreover, they, namely Venice, had found support among high-ranking Ottoman officials and within the entourage of Djem, Bayezid's brother and future rival, still only a boy at the time. Sultan Mehmed II overcame the Muslim crises (1474-1475). Although he failed in Moldavia and Albania, he won, like Bayezid II, in the Black Sea Area<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> E.g. ELTEK, *Kaprinai*, in 4<sup>o</sup>, LXVIII, no. 6, p. 13 (1<sup>st</sup> of November 1472); HHStA, R.H.K, *Fridericiana*, fasc. 5-3, f. 75<sup>r</sup> (3<sup>rd</sup> of August 1482); MDE, II, no. 219, p. 332; *Długosz* (1887), p. 609; *Malipiero*, p. 42; *Vite 1474-1494*, pp. 394-397; JOANNOU (Perikles), *Grosswesir Ahmet Herzeg Geheimchrist im Hof des Sultans zu Istanbul*, in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XXVI (1960), 1, pp. 74-80; BABINGER (Franz), *Dâvûd-Çelebi osmanischer Thronwerber des 15. Jahrhunderts*, in *Südost-Forschungen*, XVI (1957), pp. 297-311; ZIPPEL (Giuseppe), 'Un pretendente alla corte dei papi: il Turchetto', in IDEM, *Storia e cultura del Rinascimento italiano*, edited by ZIPPEL (Gianni), Padua, 1979, pp. 463-486; VATIN (Nicolas), *Itinéraires d'agents de la Porte en Italie (1483-1495): Réflexions sur l'organisation des missions ottomanes et sur la transcription turque des noms de lieux italiens*, in *Turcica*, XIX (1987), pp. 29-50; see also HANKINS (James), *Renaissance Crusader. Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II*, in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, XLIX (1995), pp. 111-207.

<sup>51</sup> For instance: ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Napoli*, cart. 244, fasc. 2, nn (9<sup>th</sup> of July 1484); *Illiria, Po-lonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 4, nn (31<sup>st</sup> of December 1484); IORGA (Nicolae), *Studii și documente cu*

In 1479, though his captains had been victorious, Matthias Corvinus viewed Venice as one of the main responsible for the recent Ottoman attack on Hungary. His charges were not unfounded and they spoke of a long, not always too well concealed, animosity between these two arms of crusading. In 1470, Venetians regarded Matthias as co-responsible for the fall of Negroponte. His fault however was not a direct, but namely an indirect one, as the king, by his own anti- and pro-Ottoman political course and more recently by his Bohemian war had put the republic at great risk in the south. The king's actions of 1471 gave (supplementary) cause to the blame. With aid from the *conte di Vulachia* and with the support of Frederic III, with whom he had reached a short-term arrangement (an arrangement which the republic had long wanted in order to fight off the Ottomans), just in order to deal a blow against their common rival Venice, Matthias had allowed Ottoman troops to cross his lands and sack the Venetian *terra ferma*. The republic apparently did not fail to immediately respond to the king's challenge and supported his domestic troubles, most likely not the extent that the plotters wanted it, but enough to pass a message to the monarch. Common (Ottoman) concerns and necessities allowed the compromised relation to survive, quite successfully, until the 'crusader discovery' and (Venetian) imposition of Moldavia, alongside Rome's risky and often mislead Italian and Eastern political gambles, pushed the relation back to its lower limits. By the end of 1476, as the son-in-law of the Ferdinand of Aragon, the adversary of virtually every Italian power which could have financed anti-Ottoman wars, and as the suzerain of Stephen of Moldavia, the vassal which wanted and was offered his own crusader place and major profit, Matthias, challenged constantly by Vienna and Krakow, seemed alone on thin anti-Ottoman ice. Behind him laid the legacy and image of his father John Hunyadi. In front of him, stood his future *blood relative*, the sultan Mehmed II<sup>52</sup>.

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*privire la istoria românilor* [Studies and Documents regarding the History of the Romanians], XVI, Bucharest, 1909; nos. 1-2, pp. 111-112; *Guerre*, nos. 83-103; pp. 103-131; *Codice*, II-2, no. 1117, pp. 195-196; MDE, II, no. 186, p. 267; III, nos. 10-15, pp. 13-20; *Veneția*, nos. 1-2, pp. 250-251; *Malipiero*, p. 283; KAPPERT (Peter), *Die osmanischen Prinzen und ihre Residenz Amasya im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Istanbul, 1976, pp. 38-39; REINDL (Hedda), *Männer um Bayezid II. Eine prosopographische Studie über die Epoche Sultan Bayezids II. (1481-1512)*, Berlin, 1983, pp. 49-51; see further MALLETT (Michael), *The Northern Italian States*, and RYDER (Alan), *The Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples*, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, VII, c. 1415-c. 1500, edited by ALLMAND (Christopher), Cambridge, 1998, pp. 566-567, and 582-583.

<sup>52</sup> ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze estere, Germania*, cart. 572, fasc. 1, nn (18<sup>th</sup> of August, 22<sup>nd</sup> of November); *Venezia*, cart. 357, fasc. 1, nn (4<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup> of January); fasc. 5, nn (27<sup>th</sup> of May); fasc. 7, nn (6<sup>th</sup> of July 1471); ASV, Arm. XXXIX-12, ff. 2<sup>r</sup>-3<sup>v</sup>, 290<sup>r</sup> (17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> of September 1470, 20<sup>th</sup> of July 1471); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 24, cc. 4<sup>v</sup>, 55<sup>r-v</sup>, 90<sup>v</sup>, 150<sup>r-v</sup> (16<sup>th</sup> of March, 25<sup>th</sup> of September 1469, 17<sup>th</sup> of March, 16<sup>th</sup> of October 1470); reg. 25, cc. 29<sup>r</sup>, 56<sup>r</sup> -57<sup>r</sup> (10<sup>th</sup> of June, 6<sup>th</sup> of September 1471; the approval given to the Ottomans to raid Venetian lands, through his own estates, backfired on Frederic III, as the Ottomans raided his lands too, during the crusader congress of Regensburg, possibly with Matthias' direct or indirect help, who had not forgotten the offences brought to him by the emperor and who still had a truce with the sultan). For king Matthias, Mehmed II and Bayezid II, see also *Notes*, V, no. 73, p. 54

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(December 1479), as well as SIMON (Alexandru), *The Ottoman Blood-Relatives of King Matthias Corvinus*, in *Between Worlds*, IV, forthcoming.

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